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ABSTRACT

A Comparison of Simulated Schizophrenia in Mental Health Experts and Genuine Schizophrenia
in Psychiatric Patients
by
Amanda Rosinski, M.A., M.Phil.

Advisor: Rebecca A. Weiss, Ph.D.
Malingering includes the intentional feigning of psychiatric symptoms combined with
motivation for external gain (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Malingering is likely to
occur in the justice system in both criminal and civil contexts, as there is increased opportunity
for secondary gain in these settings. When individuals successfully malinger, it can be very
costly for the United States. For example, if an individual successfully malingers, it can delay
their criminal proceedings, allow them to inappropriately use resources associated with
psychiatric or medical treatment, allow them to gain access to unneeded medications or financial
assistance, or allow them to avoid work (Chafetz & Underhill, 2013; Walczyk, Sewell, &
DiBenedetto, 2018). As a result, mental health experts are often asked to evaluate for
malingering in criminal and civil psycholegal contexts. Psychological testing is a primary
method used to assess for such feigned symptoms, as it standardizes the assessment process,
increasing validity and reliability of subsequent findings (Aronoff et al., 2007; Rogers & Bender,
2003). As a result, there is an abundance of literature examining the validity and reliability of
feigning measures. The majority of feigning research utilizes simulation designs, in which a
group of participants are instructed to simulate mental illness (Rogers & Gillard, 2011).
Simulation studies have been published since the 1980s (Berry & Nelson, 2010), but the context
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of feigning has changed since that time. Most notably, individuals wishing to feign a particular
disorder in recent years have easy access to a substantial amount of literature about relevant
symptoms through a simple online search. This study added to the body of literature using
mental health experts as simulators, thus considering whether those with greater knowledge of
mental illness would be identified as feigning. This study was one of the first to also examine the
impact of professional differences within an expert sample. Using an archival analysis, 271
mental health experts instructed to simulate symptoms of schizophrenia on the Personality
Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007) were compared to 81 psychiatric inpatients who
completed a genuine PAI during their inpatient hospitalization and were diagnosed with
schizophrenia at the time of their discharge. Several analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were
conducted to examine differences between these two groups, as well as differences within the
mental health experts by discipline and level of education. Results indicated that mental health
experts were generally not successful at feigning psychiatric symptoms. Experts scored
significantly higher on three of the PAI indicators of malingering when compared with the
genuine psychiatric inpatients. Further, there were no significant differences when splitting the
mental health experts group by discipline or level of education. Overall, the results suggest that
academic knowledge related to mental illness might not increase one's ability to feign mental
illness. Alternately, mental health experts may not necessarily serve as more “sophisticated”
simulators in these research designs, despite their expertise in the mental health field. The
implications of these findings and directions for future research are discussed.

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank the many people without whom the completion of my dissertation
would not have been possible. First and foremost, to Dr. Weiss, thank you for your consistent
support over the last eight years. You have always encouraged me and truly helped me to reach
my full potential in both research and clinical capacities. You gave me countless opportunities in
our Forensic Assessment Lab, and I am quite grateful for each and every experience over our last
eight years together. To Dr. Shiva, thank you for your immense support, especially at the outset
of the COVID-19 pandemic. You listened to my fears about collecting in-person data once the
pandemic hit, and you helped me brainstorm alternate pathways to a successful dissertation. I am
incredibly grateful for your trust and faith in me to utilize archival data that you collected
throughout your career. To my entire dissertation committee, thank you immensely for your
advice and flexibility throughout this process. I would not have been able to complete a
successful dissertation without you all. To all of my mentors throughout the years, I have
received tremendous guidance and learned invaluable lessons from all of you. To all of my
friends and family, thank you for supporting me through all of the challenging moments and
reminding me to prioritize my own self-care. Especially to my mother and sister, this moment
would not have been possible without your unconditional encouragement and cheering for me.
You have consistently supported me, motivated me, and reminded me why I chose this path. Last
but not least, to Sebastian, you have believed in me from the moment we met. In moments of
weakness, you are always there, helping me to find my inner strength. I am truly excited to watch
our relationship grow together. I am genuinely humbled and inspired by each and every of you,
and I want to thank you all for always believing in me to achieve my goals.

vi

CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………...

ix

LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………….

x

CHAPTER 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………..

1

The History of Malingering……………………………………………………...

2

Malingering in Forensic Contexts……………………………………………….

4

The Assessment of Malingering…………………………………………………

5

Validity in the Assessment of Feigning………………………………………….

12

Hypotheses………………………………………………………………………

29

CHAPTER 2: Methods………………………………………………………...……..

31

Participants………………………………………………………………………

31

Measures and Variables………………………………………………………….

34

Research Design and Procedure…………………………………………………

36

Statistical Analyses………………………………………………………………

37

CHAPTER 3: Results…………………………………………………………………..

42

Descriptive Statistics…………………………………………………………….

42

Hypothesis #1……………………………………………………………………

43

Hypothesis #2……………………………………………………………………

45

Hypothesis #3……………………………………………………………………

48

Hypothesis #4……………………………………………………………………

50

Hypothesis #5……………………………………………………………………

51

Examining Mental Health Experts………………………………………………

53

Hypothesis #6……………………………………………………………………

53

vii

Hypothesis #7……………………………………………………………………

54

CHAPTER 4: Discussion and Conclusions…………………………………………….

57

Limitations……………………………………………………………………….

65

Future Directions………………………………………………………………...

69

References………………………………………………………………………………

72

viii

TABLES
Page
Table 1. Descriptive statistics by group……………………………………………...

81

Table 2. Count of scales/indexes above cutoff scores...……………………………..

82

Table 3. Participants above cutoff scores and classification rates…..………...……..

83

Table 4. Expertise among simulators….……………………………………………..

84

Table 5. Descriptive statistics by education level...………………………………….

85

Table 6. Descriptive statistics by discipline………………………………………….

86

ix

FIGURES
Page
Figure 1. ROC curve comparing groups...…………………………………………...

x

87

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The construct of malingering is currently defined in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) as “the intentional production of false or
grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such
as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation, evading criminal
prosecution, or obtaining drugs” (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013, p. 726).
Malingering poses a significant burden on the United States justice system, as it has several
costly consequences in both criminal and civil contexts (Chafetz & Underhill, 2013; Walczyk,
Sewell, & DiBenedetto, 2018). In general, if an individual successfully malingers psychological
symptoms, it threatens the execution of justice. In criminal contexts, if an individual successfully
malingers psychological symptoms and is deemed incompetent to stand trial, it can delay their
criminal proceedings unnecessarily. If an individual successfully malingers psychological
symptoms and evades criminal responsibility, they may be moved from a correctional facility to
a psychiatric hospital, inappropriately utilizing limited and costly resources needed for patients
with genuine psychological disorders (Walczyk et al., 2018). Individuals who are housed in
correctional facilities may also attempt to malinger psychological or medical symptoms in order
to be transferred to a medical center, where they can be provided with costly desired medications
and allowed more freedoms (Walczyk et al., 2018). In civil contexts, individuals who
successfully feign psychological or physical symptoms may be awarded greater financial
compensation, avoid work, gain access to unneeded medications, or obtain limited financial
resources, such as public assistance. For example, Chafetz and Underhill (2013) estimated that in
2011, the cost of malingering for the United States Social Security Administration was over $20
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billion for psychological disorder disability claimants. It is important to note that this figure only
included malingered psychological disorders, not malingered physical illnesses (Chafetz &
Underhill, 2013). Clearly, the costs of malingering place a serious burden on society, as well as
the execution of justice in the United States. As such, it is essential that psychologists are
adequately trained in the detection of malingering.
The History of Malingering
Empirical psychological literature regarding the construct of malingering was codified in
1980, when it first appeared in the third version of the DSM (DSM-III; APA, 1980). Since its
initial appearance in the DSM, there have been only minor changes in its definition and
conceptualization. In the DSM-III, malingering was listed as a V code, which indicated that it
was a condition, rather than a psychiatric diagnosis, not attributable to a mental disorder but was
a focus of attention or treatment. In the DSM-III, malingering was defined as “the voluntary
production and presentation of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms.
The symptoms are produced in pursuit of a goal that is obviously recognizable with an
understanding of the individual’s circumstances rather than of his or her individual psychology”
(APA, 1980, p. 331). The DSM-III furthered the definition with examples of such goals
including avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation, evading
criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs (APA, 1980). The conceptualization of malingering
remained listed as a V code in the text revision of the DSM’s third edition (DSM-III-R; APA,
1987). The definition of malingering remained quite similar, but the term external incentives
became clearly associated with malingering in this DSM edition (APA, 1987). Malingering was
defined as “intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological
symptoms, motivated by external incentives…” (APA, 1987, p. 360). The external incentives
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listed remained the same as the examples of external goals listed in the DSM-III, with the
addition of securing better living conditions (APA, 1987). In the fourth edition of the DSM, the
conceptualization of malingering remained similar (DSM-IV; APA, 1994). However, the DSMIV specified that malingering can sometimes represent adaptive behavior, such as “feigning
illness while a captive of the enemy during wartime” (APA, 1994, p. 683).
The definition and classification of malingering remained exactly the same in the text
revision of the DSM’s fourth edition (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000) and the fifth edition (DSM-5;
APA, 2013). Further, since the condition of malingering was added to the DSM-III in 1980, there
was a note that the potential for malingering should be thoroughly assessed in certain specific
circumstances. This note has remained consistent in each of the following editions of the DSM
since 1980. In the most recent edition, the DSM-5 noted that malingering should be thoroughly
assessed for if any combination of the following specific circumstances are present:
(1) Medicolegal context of presentation (e.g., the individual is referred by an attorney to
the clinician for examination, or the individual self-refers while litigation or criminal
charges are pending);
(2) Marked discrepancy between the individual’s claimed stress or disability and the
objective findings and observations;
(3) Lack of cooperation during the diagnostic evaluation and in complying with the
prescribed treatment regimen; and
(4) The presence of antisocial personality disorder. (APA, 2013, p. 727)
In order to classify an individual as malingering, three components must be present,
including the intent to feign, the actual feigning, and the impetus for external gain (Raine, 2009).
The importance of an external incentive must be emphasized, as it differentiates malingering
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from factitious, conversion, and somatic symptom-related disorders (APA, 2013). In the case of
factitious disorders, there is an absence of obvious external gain, but rather, the individual may
be feigning symptoms in relation to internal rewards or unrecognizable external rewards. And in
the instance of both conversion and somatic symptom-related disorders, the individual is not
aware that they are feigning certain symptoms, but rather, their apparent aim is to assume the
sick role (APA, 2013). Therefore, there is no intent to feign specific symptoms.
Despite the relatively unchanged definition of malingering since its first appearance in
1980, empirical interest in the construct of malingering has increased exponentially since that
time (Berry & Nelson, 2010). In the 1980s, there were approximately 1-2 relevant empirical
publications per year that examined the construct of malingering. By the 2000s, there were
approximately 56-101 publications per year that evaluated some aspect of malingering (Berry &
Nelson, 2010). Berry & Nelson (2010) noted that in 2009, there were more than 90 publications
on malingering. A brief search of the literature published in 2020 yielded 126 publications with
the keyword “malingering,” demonstrating that empirical interest in the construct of malingering
has continued to expand over the decades.
Malingering in Forensic Contexts
In the field of forensic psychology, which bridges the gap between psychology and the
law, there is an increased opportunity for external gain. For example, individuals facing criminal
proceedings may be presented with the external gain of reduced incarceration time if they can
successfully evade criminal liability during their proceedings or use symptoms to mitigate
sentencing. In addition, individuals who initiate a civil disability or personal injury claim may be
presented with the external gain of increased monetary rewards if they can successfully report
and present with psychiatric distress. Established rates of feigned psychiatric symptoms in both

4

civil and criminal contexts have corroborated the need for a thorough assessment of malingering
in these settings. For example, the prevalence of malingering has been estimated to be around 13
– 29% in civil contexts (Merckelbach, Smeets, & Jelicic, 2009), and to vary anywhere from 17 –
56% in criminal contexts (McDermott, Dualan, & Scott, 2013; Merckelbach et al., 2009).
Therefore, in these psycholegal contexts, it is particularly important for forensic mental health
professionals to evaluate the validity of clients’ psychiatric presentations, as was stated in the
DSM-5 (APA, 2013).
Because of the high prevalence of feigned psychiatric presentations, as well as the clear
external incentives in psycholegal settings, it is essential that forensic mental health professionals
become competent in the evaluation of malingering. Although the DSM-5 criteria stipulate what
factors may distinguish genuine and malingered presentations, there have been criticisms of the
DSM-5’s approach. For example, using a sample of 24 individuals known to be malingering on
an inpatient forensic unit, Rogers (1990) criticized the DSM-5’s methodology for the assessment
of malingering, claiming that these criteria were able to detect only approximately 67% (n = 16)
of individuals who were malingering. Additionally, when using the DSM’s malingering criteria
in an examination of a comparison sample composed of 113 randomly selected psychiatric
patient records, 55% (n = 62) of individuals were identified as meeting the criteria for
malingering (Rogers, 1990). Therefore, for every one individual who was correctly identified as
malingering, four individuals likely to be genuine were incorrectly identified as malingering
(Rogers, 1990; 1997). Because of the high stakes involved in the assessment of malingering, as
well as the stigma of labeling an individual as malingering (Robinson & Monsivais, 2011),
diagnostic accuracy is of utmost importance.
The Assessment of Malingering
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The definition of malingering involves two components: the intentional feigning of
psychiatric symptoms and motivation for external gain. Although the empirical examination of
malingering has become more prevalent since the 1980s (Berry & Nelson, 2010), the conceptual
differences between malingering and feigning are an important distinction to make when
interpreting such research, as there are contexts in which the motivation for external gain is not
overtly clear or obvious. Much of the extant research examining the evaluation of malingering
are actually examining the detection of feigning. This is because much of the existing literature
focuses on psychological measures utilized to detect feigning. Because these psychological
measures do not examine for potential external gains, the conclusions drawn are about feigning
rather than malingering. There is a lack of substantial literature examining motivations for
feigning psychiatric symptoms in several psycholegal contexts, although it is evident that such
motivations exist in psycholegal contexts.
Therefore, while assessment instruments have been designed to assist with the detection
of malingering, these tools are not sufficient alone (Franklin, 2008). Forensic psychologists
should also conduct clinical interviews, which are especially important in exploring the
individual’s potential motivations for feigning (Kocsis, 2011). It has been recommended that
forensic psychologists review the individual’s case history, as well as obtain collateral
information about the individual. Relevant collateral information includes contacting people who
have had close interactions with the individual, as well as obtaining academic records, past
mental health treatment records, medical records, and rap sheets (Conroy & Kwartner, 2006).
The use of psychological instruments designed to detect feigning, in combination with collateral
information about the individual, will provide the most comprehensive evaluation for potential
malingering.
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Empirical research has found that there are several indicators of potential malingering
that can arise during a clinical interview (Conroy & Kwartner, 2006; Rogers, 1997; Rogers &
Bender, 2003). For example, individuals who are attempting to feign psychiatric symptoms are
more likely to report severe psychotic symptoms, such as frequent hallucinations and delusions.
Individuals may report that they have a number of severe psychiatric symptoms that are not
typically experienced together (Rogers, 1997). These individuals may reiterate the prevalence of
these symptoms several times throughout the clinical interview in an attempt to remind the
forensic mental health professional of their severity. However, individuals who are attempting to
feign psychiatric symptoms may stop conveying such symptoms throughout the duration of the
clinical interview because of fatigue (Conroy & Kwartner, 2006). In these instances, research has
recommended that an attempt to feign psychiatric symptoms is considered (Conroy & Kwartner,
2006; Rogers, 1997; Rogers & Bender, 2003).
Even though the above indicators to examine during a clinical interview are empiricallysupported and can assist a forensic mental health professional’s clinical judgment in the
assessment of malingering, this method alone is often not sufficient to accurately assess for
malingering (Rogers & Shuman, 2000). Clinical judgment alone introduces the threat of
individual biases from the psychological evaluators. For example, clinical judgment relies on
intuition and is only one point of possibly idiosyncratic data. This method risks the possibility of
misclassification of malingering (Rogers & Bender, 2003). As such, it has been recommended
that no assessment of malingering rely solely on a clinical interview (Rogers & Shuman, 2000).
Psychological testing may be used to aid with detection and diagnostic accuracy of malingering
(Resnick, 1999; Resnick & Knoll, 2018; Rogers & Bender, 2003). Even with the limitation that
psychological testing examines feigning and not malingering, the aid of psychological testing in
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the assessment of symptom validity is essential because it standardizes the process in which
psychologists assess for feigning and aims to increase validity and reliability of findings
(Aronoff et al., 2007). It also introduces another point of data for psychologists to consider in
their assessment of malingering (Rogers & Bender, 2003). There are several psychological
instruments that are designed to detect feigned impairment. These measures, if standardized and
validated appropriately, are often able to assist the forensic mental health professional in the
evaluation of malingering.
Broadly speaking, the assessment of feigning includes two different types of testing,
which are cognitive effort testing and exaggerated psychiatric symptom testing. Tests of
cognitive effort examine for specific feigned cognitive deficits, such as fabrication of intellectual
or neuropsychological deficits (Conroy & Kwartner, 2006; Rogers & Bender, 2003). There is a
wide array of measures designed to detect feigned cognitive impairment, and reviews of such
measures are available elsewhere (Rogers & Bender, 2003). In addition to tests of cognitive
effort, there are also psychological measures designed to assess the validity of reported
psychiatric presentations. There are also multiple methods in which tests of feigned psychiatric
symptoms can be administered to an individual. For example, scales that evaluate feigning may
be embedded in broad psychological tests, such as multiscale measures of psychopathology,
which include several validity scales within the measure (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2020a; 2020b;
Morey, 2007). Tests of feigned psychiatric symptoms may also be standalone, which means their
only goal is to assess the validity of the individual’s presentation. For example, there are
structured interviews that aim to assess for bizarre psychological symptom presentations only
(Rogers, Sewell, & Gillard, 2010). Utilizing a multimethod approach that includes both
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embedded and standalone tests of feigned impairment will help to bolster the comprehensiveness
of the feigning assessment.
While it is not possible to review all measures developed to examine exaggerated
psychiatric symptoms, some validated tests of exaggerated psychiatric symptoms (Rogers &
Bender, 2003) include the Structured Inventory of Reported Symptoms – 2nd Edition (SIRS-2;
Rogers et al., 2010), Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST; Miller, 2001),
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – 3rd Edition (MMPI-3; Ben-Porath & Tellegen,
2020a; 2020b), and Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007). The SIRS-2 and MFAST are considered to be standalone measures of feigned psychiatric symptoms, while the
MMPI-3 and PAI are multiscale measures of psychopathology that have embedded validity
scales. Overall, tests examining exaggerated psychiatric symptoms were designed to assess the
genuine nature of reported psychiatric symptoms. As such, the predominant goal of these tests is
to ensure that individuals are endorsing genuine psychological symptom patterns, and not overor under-reporting symptoms or reporting inconsistent symptoms. Therefore, cut scores are
utilized to classify individuals as responding genuinely versus those with a likelihood of
distorting psychological symptoms.
Standalone feigning measures. The Structured Inventory of Reported Symptoms – 2nd
Edition (SIRS-2; Rogers et al., 2010) is a 172-item structured interview that assesses for
distortion of psychological symptoms (Rogers et al., 2010). The SIRS-2 contains eight primary
scales that assess for a range of feigning strategies, including rare symptoms, implausible or
absurd symptoms, unusual symptom combination, discrepancies in reported and observed
symptoms, excessive severe symptoms, excessive blatant symptoms, excessive subtle symptoms,
and a high number of overly selective symptoms (Rogers et al., 2010). The SIRS-2 then utilizes a
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four-option decision model to determine if the individual is likely to be responding genuinely,
responding in an indeterminate style, probably feigning, or definitely feigning (Rogers et al.,
2010).
The Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST; Miller, 2001) is a 25-item
screening interview that assesses likelihood of feigning psychiatric illnesses. The M-FAST seven
scales that each assess for a unique feigning strategy, including Reported vs. Observed
Symptoms, Extreme Symptomatology, Rare Combinations, Unusual Hallucinations, Unusual
Symptom Course, Negative Image, and Suggestibility (Miller, 2001). Then, a total score is
created to determine whether an individual may be potentially feigning psychiatric symptoms.
Because the M-FAST is a screening questionnaire, a score above the listed cutoff indicates that
further evaluation of malingering is needed (Miller, 2001).
Embedded feigning measures. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – 3rd
Edition (MMPI-3; Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2020a; 2020b) is a 335-item forced-choice (true,
false) self-report measure of general psychopathology. Embedded in the MMPI-3 are several
validity indicators that assess response consistency, defensiveness, and endorsement of
infrequent response patterns (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2020a; 2020b). The Cannot Say (CNS)
scale examines non-responsiveness to the MMPI-3 content, the Variable Response Inconsistency
(VRIN) scale measures consistency of responding, and the True Response Inconsistency (TRIN)
scale measures a tendency to over-endorse items in one direction (Ben-Porath & Tellegen,
2020a; 2020b). The Combined Response Inconsistency (CRIN) scale, which is a new addition to
the MMPI-3, combines the inconsistent response composites from both the VRIN and TRIN
scales into a mixed inconsistent responding scale (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2020a; 2020b).
Several MMPI-3 scales estimate the accuracy of reported psychiatric symptoms, including the
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Infrequent Responses (F) scale, Infrequent Psychopathology Responses (Fp) scale, Infrequent
Somatic Responses (Fs) scale, Symptom Validity (FBS) scale, Response Bias (RBS) scale,
Uncommon Virtues (L) scale, and Adjustment Validity (K) scale. These scales examine the
individual’s attempt to over-report symptoms, under-report symptoms, or respond to the test in a
defensive manner (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2020a; 2020b). There are also several indexes that
have been developed to further assess response styles on the MMPI. The Obvious-Subtle index
(O-S) is a measure of exaggerated psychological distress characterized by more frequent
endorsement of obvious rather than subtle items of distress (Wiener, 1948). Finally, the F – K
index is a measure of dissimulation that attempts to identify minimized psychological distress
(Gough, 1950).
The Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007) is a 344-item forced-choice
(false, slightly true, mostly true, very true) self-report measure of psychopathology. Embedded in
the PAI are four validity indicators that assess for impression management, response consistency,
and infrequent responding (Morey, 2007). The Inconsistency (INC) scale examines consistency
of response style throughout the administration of the PAI. The Infrequency (INF) scale
examines endorsement of infrequent or atypical symptoms. Finally, the Negative Impression
Management (NIM) scale assesses for a tendency to over-endorse and present a negative
presentation of the individual’s psychiatric symptoms, while the Positive Impression
Management (PIM) scale reflects a tendency to under-endorse and present a positive presentation
of the self as favorable and free from faults (Morey, 2007).
Beyond the PAI’s four validity scales, there are also several indexes that have been
developed to further assess symptom validity on the PAI. The Malingering Index (MAL) and
Defensiveness Index (DEF) were developed by Morey shortly after the first version of the PAI
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was released (Morey, 1993; 1996). MAL is an index composed of eight profile features which
have been shown to occur much more frequently in profiles in which respondents feigned a
specific mental disorder. DEF is an index consisting of features that have been shown to be more
present in the profiles of individuals attempting to minimize psychiatric problems (Morey, 1993;
1996). The Cashel Discriminant Function (CDF) is another measure of defensiveness that has
been found to discriminate better than the PIM validity scale alone (Cashel, Rogers, Sewell, &
Martin-Cannici, 1995). Finally, the Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF) is a combination of
PAI scales that was created because it best differentiated feigning groups from a genuine clinical
patients group taken from the normative database of the PAI (Rogers, Sewell, Morey, & Ustad,
1996). These scales and indexes are used to detect feigned psychological presentations on the
PAI.
Validity in the Assessment of Feigning
Because commonly developed measures assess the validity of symptoms rather than the
incentive for invalid symptoms, the majority of research in this domain consists of findings about
feigning rather than malingering. There are four major methods utilized in conducting research
on feigning, including known-groups comparisons, bootstrapping, differential prevalence, and
simulation designs (Rogers & Gillard, 2011). In known-groups comparisons, individuals who
have been externally identified as feigning are compared to individuals with genuine
psychological disorders, resulting in high external validity. These designs typically rely on
mental health experts that independently identify individuals as feigning. If these mental health
experts accurately identify feigning individuals as such, then the design also has high internal
validity (Rogers & Gillard, 2011). However, the design’s internal validity will weaken if the
identification of those who are feigning is inaccurate due to lack of expertise, relying on
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inaccurate detection strategies, or using a classification method that is too broad (Rogers &
Gillard, 2011). Bootstrapping involves the use of multiple feigning measures to classify
individuals as likely-feigning and likely-honest, and these groups are then compared to one
another. In differential prevalence designs, comparisons are made between individuals from
settings that are assumed to have distinct prevalence rates of malingering, such as forensic and
clinical settings. This method assumes that individuals in forensic settings, with external
incentives to feign, will feign at a higher prevalence than individuals in clinical settings, without
external incentives to feign. However, this method is considered to lack experimental rigor
because there is no external criterion available to verify the exact percentages of genuine versus
feigning participants in either group (Rogers & Gillard, 2011).
The most common method utilized to research malingering is the simulation design
(Rogers & Gillard, 2011). Simulation designs involve the comparison of responses from genuine
individuals to individuals instructed to feign on specific psychological measures (Rogers &
Gillard, 2011). Simulation designs yield the strongest internal validity, but sometimes at the
expense of external validity (Rogers & Gillard, 2011). In simulation designs, genuine responses
can consist of those without clinical symptoms who are instructed to respond honestly (“honest
respondents”), or individuals with true mental illnesses (“clinical comparison group;” Hawes &
Boccaccini, 2009). The use of a clinical comparison group strengthens the design’s external
validity, and it is therefore strongly recommended when utilizing this method (Rogers, 1997).
Feigned responses consist of research participants who are instructed to simulate a mental illness
(Rogers & Bender, 2003). These feigned responses are compared to genuine individuals to
determine the psychological measure’s classification accuracy (Rogers & Gillard, 2011).
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In simulation designs, research participants are instructed to simulate, or feign, mental
illness. The research participants may be coached or trained prior to participation, and they may
be incentivized to increase motivation. These variables are sometimes introduced because it is
believed that they increase the external validity of the design by creating more real-world
circumstances (Rogers & Gillard, 2011). Research participants may also be instructed to simulate
a specific mental illness or to simulate mental illness more broadly (Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009).
While it may increase motivation to do well when provided with more specific instructions, such
as simulating a specific mental illness, this method still fails to address why simulating
successfully is important in this research design, regardless of type of mental illness (Rogers &
Gillard, 2011). As such, researchers have questioned the ecological validity of simulation
designs for decades (e.g., Haines & Norris, 1995). One main concern with simulation designs is
whether those who are simulating in a research study respond similarly to those who are feigning
in a real world context. An additional concern includes the potential differences between the
coaching or training that research participants receive compared to the knowledge that inmates
may learn from their peers about how to successfully simulate symptoms of mental illness while
in an incarcerated setting.
Due to the concern regarding the presentation of simulated responses in a research design
versus a real-world context, the type of population examined is an important consideration in
these designs. The utilization of samples of convenience in simulation designs, particularly when
lacking a clinical comparison sample, has exacerbated concerns relating to the external validity
of these studies (Brennan & Gouvier, 2006). These concerns can relate to both the knowledge of
diagnostic criteria, as well as the motivation to feign. The knowledge that individuals have about
the symptoms of mental illness can vary substantially. Existing research in this domain has
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utilized a wide range of individuals, including those with mental illnesses, undergraduate
students, and mental health experts as part of their simulation designs. While individuals with
mental illnesses and mental health experts may both have more knowledge about mental
illnesses, mental health experts may better understand how to simulate more effectively, as these
experts are charged with the identification of feigning.
Examining feigning among individuals with mental illnesses. Several research studies
have examined samples of individuals with genuine mental illnesses who were asked to simulate
more severe psychiatric symptoms or different symptoms than those genuinely experienced. One
of the first studies using this design examined a sample of 42 chronic outpatients who were most
commonly diagnosed with schizophrenia, mood disorders, borderline personality disorder, and/or
substance use disorders (Rogers, Sewell, & Ustad, 1995). These outpatient participants
completed the MMPI-2 on two occasions. They were instructed to first respond honestly, and
then to simulate “severe psychiatric problems” (Rogers et al., 1995). When responding honestly,
the majority of participants had elevated scores on the Infrequency (F) and Back Page
Infrequency (Fb) validity scales, indicating they were at a high risk of being mislabeled as
feigners. Specifically, 88.1% of participants had elevated scores on the Infrequency (F) scale (F
> 29), and 95.2% of participants had elevated scores on the Back Page Infrequency (Fb) scale
(Fb > 25; Rogers et al., 1995). When simulating, 92.9% of participants had elevated scores on
the Infrequency (F) scale again. In general, the participants were able to present severe
psychological distress at a similar rate, and they were therefore not detected well by the
Infrequency (F) scale when responding genuinely versus simulating severe psychiatric problems.
Rogers and colleagues (1995) concluded that clinicians should interpret validity scales carefully
when examining individuals with chronic mental illnesses and suggested that multiple validity
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indices may be needed to detect feigned psychological presentations in this population. Berry et
al. (2001) conducted a similar study with 132 outpatient psychotherapy participants who were
randomly assigned to respond honestly, exaggerate their genuine symptoms, feign a specific
disorder, or feign general psychological distress on the MMPI-2. The results indicated that the
validity scale scores were significantly higher for all three simulation groups when compared to
the honest respondents. However, there were no significant differences in validity scale scores
between the three simulation groups (Berry et al., 2001).
Other researchers have utilized similar designs with samples of psychiatric inpatients
instructed to simulate psychiatric symptoms. In 1998, Arbisi and Ben-Porath examined a sample
of 74 psychiatric inpatients from a Veteran Affairs Medical Center. The participants completed
the MMPI-2 after being randomly assigned to respond honestly or to simulate exaggerated
psychiatric distress with a greater severity than their genuine psychiatric symptoms. Their results
were compared to their previously completed MMPI-2 upon their admission to the Veteran
Affairs Medical Center (Arbisi & Ben-Porath, 1998). Similar to Rogers et al.’s (1995) findings,
the Infrequency (F) scale did not distinguish between the two groups. However, the
Psychopathology Infrequency (Fp) scale was able to detect the simulated group from the honest
group, suggesting that the Fp scale outperforms the F scale when examining individuals with
mental illnesses (Arbisi & Ben-Porath, 1998). Finally, in 2007, Baity, Siefert, Chambers, and
Blais investigated the validity indicators on the PAI also using a sample of 62 psychiatric
inpatients. All of the participants completed the PAI honestly first, and then were randomly
assigned to respond honestly, exaggerate their psychological symptoms, or minimize their
psychological symptoms when completing the PAI for a second time (Baity et al., 2007). The
results were all in the expected directions, with no differences in the honest group, lower scores
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in the minimizing group, and higher scores in the exaggerating group. Baity and colleagues
(2007) concluded that the NIM scale and RDF index were able to detect participants in the
exaggerating group, and the PIM scale was able to detect participants in the minimizing group,
providing promising evidence for the PAI’s validity indicators. However, simulation designs
utilizing psychiatric patients as simulators face an inherent limitation when interpreting their
findings, in which it is difficult to ensure that psychiatric patients actually followed instructions
and simulated psychiatric symptoms. In a non-symptomatic sample, the elevation of psychiatric
scales might be used to infer whether participants made a genuine attempt to feign symptoms. In
samples with psychiatric symptoms, clinical elevations would be expected regardless of any
attempt to feign or exaggerate symptoms. Some researchers address this limitation with the
inclusion of a post-test questionnaire, asking participants to summarize their instructions and
describe their attempt to feign at the conclusion of the study (e.g., Weiss & Rosenfeld, 2017).
Additionally, individuals with genuine mental illnesses who are instructed to simulate
may technically be exaggerating their genuine symptoms rather than feigning distinct symptoms.
Yet, this exaggeration of existing genuine mental illness may be more realistic than using nonclinical populations that are instructed to feign. One final major disadvantage of utilizing
individuals with mental illnesses in simulation designs is the difficulty in accessing this
population, often resulting in small sample sizes.
Examining feigning among undergraduate students. Although some research has been
conducted using individuals with genuine mental illnesses who are instructed to simulate
psychological distress, the majority of simulation designs utilize undergraduate students,
typically recruited from undergraduate psychology courses, as simulators. One of the first studies
examining undergraduate participants as simulators utilized the MMPI-2, and participants were
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able to choose whether they wanted to exaggerate or minimize their psychological distress
(Nicholson et al., 1997). Participants were instructed to fake in a believable manner, but they
were not coached or trained in further detail. The results found that the F scale, Fp scale, and F –
K index detected participants in the exaggerated symptoms group. The S scale was able to detect
differences among participants in the minimized symptoms group, but the differences were small
when compared to honest respondents (Nicholson et al., 1997). Bagby and colleagues (1997b)
conducted a similar study, but undergraduate participants were instructed to respond honestly or
minimize their psychological distress only. These researchers also found that the S scale was
able to distinguish honest respondents from those minimizing psychological distress (Bagby et
al., 1997b).
In order to increase motivation and effort when instructing undergraduate participants to
feign psychological distress, researchers have also randomly assigned undergraduate participants
to be coached in successful feigning or remain uncoached. This practice is warranted in research
settings, as a survey of attorneys and law students revealed that approximately 50% of attorneys
and 33% of law students believed that clients referred for psychological testing should be
educated about validity scales and how to evade detection on response distortion measures
(Wetter & Corrigan, 1995). Therefore, in 2002, Bagby, Nicholson, Bacchiochi, Ryder, and Bury
conducted a study in which undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to be coached or
uncoached about the validity scales on the MMPI-2 and PAI. All participants were then
instructed to exaggerate psychological distress on both measures, and their results were
compared to a sample of genuine psychiatric patients who completed both measures honestly.
The results indicated that coaching participants did not have a significant effect on their ability to
feign psychological distress. On the MMPI-2, the Fp, F, and Fb scales distinguished between
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simulators and genuine patients. On the PAI, the RDF index was the only indicator that was able
to significantly distinguish between simulators and genuine patients. These researchers
concluded that when comparing the validity indicators on the MMPI-2 and PAI, the RDF index
on the PAI was marginally superior to the MMPI-2’s validity indicators (Bagby et al., 2002).
Blanchard, McGrath, Pogge, and Khadivi (2003) conducted a similar study with undergraduate
participants who were randomly assigned to exaggerate psychological distress in either a forensic
or psychiatric scenario. All undergraduate participants were coached about the validity scales
and provided diagnostic information about symptoms of psychosis (forensic scenario) or major
depression (psychiatric scenario). The results yielded that while the F – K index and Fp scale
were able to detect simulators from honest respondents on the MMPI-2, the PAI scales
demonstrated incremental validity over the MMPI-2 in all analyses (Blanchard et al., 2003). Both
of these studies provided promising evidence for the validity indicators on the PAI.
In addition to varying whether undergraduate participants are coached on validity
indicators, research in this population has also examined if undergraduate students could feign
more successfully when instructed to feign a specific mental illness. Several researchers have
focused specifically on instructing undergraduates to simulate post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). When undergraduate participants were instructed to feign PTSD and compared with
combat-related war veterans (Elhai, Gold, Frueh, & Gold, 2000) and survivors of child sexual
abuse (Elhai, Gold, Sellers, & Dorfman, 2001) on the MMPI-2, several validity indicators on the
measure were able to distinguish feigners from those with genuine PTSD. In both research
studies, the O-S and F – K indexes were significant predictors of feigning (Elhai et al., 2000;
Elhai et al., 2001). Similar to previous research conducted on the impact of coaching
undergraduate participants, when participants were coached specifically regarding symptoms of
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PTSD and warned about validity indicators, they were more likely to successfully feign PTSD on
a brief measure of post-traumatic stress when compared with those who were uncoached (Elhai
et al., 2007). However, when using the PAI and comparing coached and uncoached
undergraduate participants to patients with genuine symptoms of post-traumatic stress, the results
were not as distinct (Bowen & Bryant, 2006). These researchers found that both undergraduate
participants who were coached on symptoms of post-traumatic stress and uncoached were easily
detected on the PAI when compared with patients diagnosed with acute stress disorder. In
particular, the NIM scale and MAL index distinguished coached and uncoached participants
from genuine respondents (Bowen & Bryant, 2006). Guriel-Tennant and Fremouw (2006)
conducted a similar study with coached and uncoached undergraduate participants instructed to
feign symptoms of PTSD, but they also accounted for participants’ trauma history. Similar to
Bowen and Bryant (2006), these researchers found that participants who were coached and
participants who had a positive trauma history were no more successful at feigning than those
who were uncoached or did not have a history of trauma (Guriel-Tennant & Fremouw, 2006).
Taken together, all of these findings suggest that when undergraduate participants are instructed
to specifically feign symptoms of PTSD, they are still able to be detected on several different
psychological measures of feigning. These results generally held true even when participants
were coached about symptoms of PTSD and validity indicators on the measures.
In addition to instructions to specifically feign PTSD, other researchers have examined
specific instructions for other mental illnesses. In 2006, Jelicic, Hessels, and Merckelbach
utilized a sample of 60 undergraduate participants that were instructed to respond honestly or
feign psychosis. Among those who were instructed to feign psychosis, they were randomly
assigned to receive no additional information, some information about symptoms of psychosis,
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or some information about symptoms of psychosis plus a warning about the validity indicators
(Jelicic et al., 2006). A screening feigning measure was able to distinguish honest responders
from the three feigning groups, but there were no significant differences between the three
feigning groups. These results suggest that even with coaching about symptoms of psychosis and
warnings about validity indicators, psychosis simulators were still detected by psychological
testing (Jelicic et al., 2006). Finally, Veltri and Williams (2013) furthered the body of research
examining specific disorders by manipulating the specific mental illness that undergraduate
participants were instructed to feign. Their sample of 265 undergraduates were randomly
assigned to feign schizophrenia, PTSD, or generalized anxiety disorder, and they were randomly
assigned to be coached about the validity indicators and symptoms of the disorder or remain
uncoached (Veltri & Williams, 2013). The results indicated that the type of disorder being
feigned moderated the impact of coaching on successful feigning. Specifically, validity
indicators were higher for those who feigned schizophrenia when compared with those who
feigned PTSD or generalized anxiety disorder. In other words, coaching for PTSD and
generalized anxiety disorder significantly increased the probability of successful feigning, but
coaching did not impact those in the feigned schizophrenia group (Veltri & Williams, 2013).
Overall, these findings indicate that several factors can impact undergraduate participants’ ability
to successfully simulate mental illnesses, including coaching about validity indicators on
psychological measures, providing instructions about feigning a specific disorder rather than
general feigning, and training participants about symptoms of the mental illnesses. But still,
across these studies, simulating undergraduate participants were typically distinguished from
honest respondents on the psychological measures of feigning.
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While it is often more difficult to access individuals with genuine mental illnesses as
simulating participants, these designs utilizing undergraduate students as simulators typically
include larger samples due to the ease of accessing this population. But while undergraduate
students in psychology courses may have some basic knowledge about mental illnesses, they
may not understand why it is important to put forth effort in successfully simulating or how to
relate to the scenarios provided in the research study. For example, undergraduate students may
relate more directly to a scenario in which their simulated mental illness caused them to miss an
exam compared to a scenario in which their simulated mental illness caused them to commit a
violent felony (Rogers & Gillard, 2011). In order to address this limitation, some researchers
began to use mental health experts as simulating participants.
Examining feigning among mental health experts. Although the majority of simulation
research has been conducted with undergraduate student samples, who are typically recruited
from psychology classes, these samples are still relatively naïve regarding knowledge of
psychopathology. However, with the modern ease of internet searching, individuals wishing to
feign particular psychiatric symptoms, or a mental illness, in recent years are now able to access
a substantial amount of relevant information through a simple online search. Further, as it
became more standard to include instructions to warn or coach participants about validity scales
in simulation research, some researchers became concerned with psychological test security. In
other words, coaching participants may undermine test security by inadvertently teaching
individuals how to successfully feign mental illnesses beyond the scope of their research
participation (Bagby et al., 1997a). This is especially true with an undergraduate student
population, who may not continue to practice psychology beyond earning their undergraduate
degree. In order to overcome these limitations in simulation research, some researchers began to
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use individuals earning a higher education in the mental health field or directly working in the
mental health field as simulation participants. Further, mental health experts may have the most
intrinsic motivation to simulate well in this type of research study, as they likely learned the
importance of accurately detecting malingering during their training.
In 1993, Rogers, Ornduff, and Sewell conducted the first study using graduate
psychology students as “sophisticated” simulators. In this study, undergraduate “naïve”
simulators and graduate “sophisticated” simulators were instructed to feign schizophrenia,
depression, or generalized anxiety disorder when completing the PAI. Sophisticated simulators
were given one week to prepare their feigned presentation, and naïve simulators were given
minimal preparation time (Rogers et al., 1993). The results indicated that the NIM scale was able
to detect those feigning schizophrenia, somewhat detect those feigning depression, and it was not
able to detect those feigning generalized anxiety disorder. Interestingly, level of sophistication
did not significantly impact ability to feign (Rogers et al., 1993). Rogers, Sewell, Morey, and
Ustad (1996) conducted a follow-up study using a larger sample of doctoral psychology students
as sophisticated simulators. Instead of comparing naïve and sophisticated simulator participants
to honest respondents, they were compared to patients with genuine schizophrenia, depression,
or generalized anxiety disorder (Rogers et al., 1996). In this study, sophisticated simulators were
able to focus on their specific feigned disorder, whereas naïve simulators presented feigned
symptoms across many of the PAI’s clinical scales. Therefore, the validity scales had moderate
predictive power among the naïve simulators, but only modest predictive power among the
sophisticated simulators (Rogers et al., 1996).
In a similar study conducted by Marion, Sellbom, and Bagby (2011), advanced clinical
psychology graduate students were utilized as sophisticated simulators. The naïve and
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sophisticated simulators were asked to feign major depressive disorder, schizophrenia, or PTSD,
and their results were compared with patients diagnosed with the respective genuine disorders.
The results indicated that although the sophisticated simulators were less likely to be detected
when compared with the naïve simulators, both groups were detected by the psychological
feigning measure when compared with the genuine patients (Marion et al., 2011). These studies
provided overall evidence that although some advanced education in the psychological field may
increase chances of successful feigning, psychological measures were still generally able to
detect the feigners as such.
In 2001, Viglione and colleagues furthered this body of research by examining a sample
of clinical psychology graduate students who were randomly assigned to feign depression or
respond honestly on the MMPI-2. However, these researchers reintroduced the variable of
providing caution to avoid detection on the psychological measure, and the graduate students
were also randomly assigned to receive caution or no caution. The results indicated that when the
sophisticated graduate student simulators were provided with caution to avoid detection, the
MMPI-2 validity scales were not able to distinguish the feigners from honest respondents
(Viglione et al., 2001). This study provides evidence that sophistication in the psychological field
combined with coaching prior to psychological testing may lead to successful feigning. Building
upon this finding, general intelligence may also impact the ability to successfully feign (Pelfrey,
2004). Using a sample of graduate psychology students who completed a psychological measure
of intelligence and then were asked to feign mental illness to avoid criminal responsibility for an
alleged homicide, a higher level of intelligence was significantly related to evading detection of
feigned symptoms on the MMPI-2 (Pelfrey, 2004). Therefore, it may not be a level of
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sophistication specifically related to psychological knowledge, but rather a higher level of
general intelligence that contributes to successful feigning.
With the consideration that general intelligence or sophistication in the psychological
field may improve the ability to feign mental illness, several researchers began examining
feigned schizophrenia specifically, as previous research has suggested that feigning symptoms of
schizophrenia may be more challenging than feigning symptoms of anxiety or depression
(Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009; Rogers et al., 1993). For example, Bagby and colleagues (1997a)
utilized two sophisticated simulator groups, which consisted of 26 psychiatric residents and
fellows and 28 psychology graduate students, and one naïve simulator group of undergraduate
students. All simulators were instructed to feign schizophrenia and completed the MMPI-2.
Bagby and colleagues (1997a) predicted that the psychology graduate students would perform
better on this task when compared with the psychiatric residents because of their knowledge
about psychopathology and psychological testing. When compared with patients with genuine
schizophrenia, all three simulator groups were distinguished from the honest respondents.
However, the two sophisticated simulator groups generally had lower scores on the validity
scales when compared with the naïve simulators (Bagby et al., 1997a). There were no significant
differences between the psychology graduate students and psychiatric residents, although the
psychology graduate students had lower scores as a group on the validity scales. The researchers
explained that there was a range of different experiences within the psychology graduate student
group, which could have impacted these findings. They recommended using psychology experts
or MMPI-2 experts in future research (Bagby et al., 1997a).
In a similar study, Jelicic, van Gaal, and Peters (2013) utilized a sample of 23 mental
health experts, which consisted of clinicians working in a psychiatric hospital (n = 9) and clinical
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researchers working in a university (n = 14). The researchers noted that all mental health experts
had at least a master’s degree and either clinical experience or research experience with
psychosis (Jelicic et al., 2013). The mental health experts, along with a group of 24 naïve
students, were provided with a screening measure of feigning via mail. They were asked to first
respond honestly, and then to complete the measure a second time while feigning symptoms of
psychosis to avoid criminal responsibility for a serious offense (Jelicic et al., 2013). Similar to
previous findings, both groups of simulators were detected as feigners on the screening measure,
but the mental health experts had lower scores on the validity scales when compared with the
naïve students (Jelicic et al., 2013). However, a major limitation of this design is that all
participants completed these measures independently after receiving them in the mail, which
violates standardized test administration. Further, due to the small sample size, these researchers
were unable to examine differences within the mental health experts group, including differences
by level of education, or differences by experience in the clinical versus research domains.
Finally, Poggioli (2001) conducted a similar study using therapy aids working in an
inpatient psychiatric hospital as sophisticated simulators of schizophrenia. In this study, the naïve
simulators were community participants. Both groups were randomly assigned to be coached or
uncoached about the validity scales on the MMPI-2 as well (Poggioli, 2001). The results
indicated that all four groups were detected as feigners when compared with patients with
genuine schizophrenia. Similar to previous findings, the therapy aids who received coaching had
the lowest scores on the validity scales (Poggioli, 2001). However, Poggioli (2001) noted that
while the therapy aids represented a group of individuals with expertise in working with patients
with schizophrenia, they were also a sample of convenience and were recruited from only one
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hospital. It is also possible that therapy aids do not have any formal education in the mental
health field, but rather they are only exposed to job-specific training at the psychiatric hospital.
Taken together, the findings from Bagby and colleagues (1997a), Jelicic and colleagues
(2013), and Poggioli (2001) suggest that educational or clinical expertise in the mental health
field may somewhat improve the ability to feign symptoms of schizophrenia, but not to a
significant level that evades detection on psychological testing. Bagby et al. (1997a) was able to
compare psychological experts with psychiatric experts, but did not find any significant
differences, possibly because the psychological experts were graduate students with varying
levels of experience. These results demonstrate that experience is not an absolute or
unidimensional construct. Further, those with expertise in psychiatry versus psychology undergo
distinct training and receive different clinical opportunities. For example, as Bagby et al. (1997a)
noted, psychological experts receive much more extensive training on psychological testing
when compared to psychiatric experts. These differences in the construct of experience
demonstrate its multidimensional and continuous nature. In addition, the type of experience that
is relevant to a particular feigning scenario could have also impacted these findings. For
example, a psychotherapist with experience in cognitive behavioral therapy for anxiety-related
disorders may not necessarily have an improved ability to feign symptoms of schizophrenia due
to their experience in treating symptoms of anxiety. Jelicic et al. (2013) was not able to compare
differences within their mental health experts group due to their small sample size. And Poggioli
(2001) utilized a group of therapy aids with clinical exposure to patients with schizophrenia, but
this study did not describe the aids’ formal educational background in relation to the mental
health field. Therefore, while it is possible that mental health experts may be able to feign
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symptoms of schizophrenia or psychosis more successfully than naïve individuals, further
research is needed to examine differences within the population of mental health experts.
The current study addressed the existing gap in the literature by utilizing a large sample
of mental health experts with varying expertise and levels of education who were instructed to
simulate paranoid schizophrenia on the PAI (Morey, 2007). This study is particularly timely in
consideration of modern advances with technology and the wealth of information available on
the internet. For example, in recent years, individuals wishing to feign particular psychiatric
symptoms, or a mental illness, are now able to access a substantial amount of relevant
information through a simple online search. This may increase their chances of feigning such
symptoms successfully. Therefore, simulation research utilizing individuals directly working in
the mental health field as simulation participants may display the degree to which true clinical
knowledge of symptoms, rather than knowledge learned only academically, could help an
individual feign successfully. Further, the use of mental health experts may serve as a more
suitable proxy for individuals who attempt to feign psychiatric symptoms in real world contexts.
For example, although their source of motivation is different from these individuals, who have
easy access to relevant knowledge using the internet and are motivated by the possibility of
external gains, mental health experts also have easy access to relevant knowledge through their
training and experience, and they may be motivated to learn about feigning and simulate
successfully due to their own professional goals.
Existing research has found that the PAI has several validity indicators that are sensitive
to both coached and uncoached feigning. For uncoached feigning, the effect sizes are even larger
when identifying feigning of severe mental illnesses rather than anxiety or mood disorders, and
when comparing feigners to clinical patients rather than honest respondents (Hawes &
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Boccaccini, 2009). The current study built upon this literature by instructing a large sample of
mental health experts to feign paranoid schizophrenia, which is a severe mental illness, on a
widely used psychological measure. The results of the feigning group were then compared to
patients diagnosed with genuine paranoid schizophrenia. This study was the first to examine the
differences in symptom validity between simulating mental health experts and genuine
psychiatric patients using the PAI, which features three strong validity indicators, including the
NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index (Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009). Finally, this study was
one of the first to examine several differences between mental health experts based on their
clinical discipline and level of education, addressing this gap in the literature.
Hypotheses
Based on a review of the extant literature, the current study had seven main hypotheses:
1. It was expected that, using their expertise in the field, the mental health experts group
would be able to successfully feign paranoid schizophrenia on the PAI (Morey, 2007), such that
they would not have overall elevated scores on the PAI Negative Impression Management (NIM)
scale, Malingering (MAL) index, or Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF) index, but they would
have at least one elevated score on one of the eleven PAI clinical scales.
2. It was expected that the genuine psychiatric patients group would not be identified as
feigning psychiatric symptoms on the PAI, such that they would not have overall elevated scores
on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index.
3. Because the mental health experts were expected to successfully feign paranoid
schizophrenia on the PAI, it was expected that the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index
would not demonstrate significant predictive power or high classification accuracy between
groups.
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4. It was expected that there would be no significant differences on the PAI NIM scale,
MAL index, or RDF index between the mental health experts group and genuine psychiatric
patients group, signifying that the expertise within the mental health experts group impacted their
ability to successfully feign paranoid schizophrenia.
5. It was expected that when the MAL index cutoff score, RDF index cutoff score, and
NIM scale cutoff score were used together, this would improve classification accuracy above the
NIM scale cutoff score alone.
6. Within the mental health experts group, it was expected that those with doctoral
degrees or beyond would be significantly less likely to be detected as feigning on the PAI, such
that they would have significantly lower PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index scores,
when compared with those with less than doctoral degrees in the mental health field.
7. Within the mental health experts group, it was expected that those in the psychiatric
field would be significantly more likely to be detected as feigning on the PAI, such that they
would have significantly higher scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index, when
compared with those in the psychological field.
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CHAPTER 2
Method
Participants
The sample for the current study represents a subset of a larger database that was
collected at Bellevue Hospital Center through New York University School of Medicine. All
staff that collected data and participants included in the current study were from Bellevue
Hospital Center. The sample included two groups: psychiatric inpatients and mental health
experts. In order to be included in the psychiatric inpatients group, participants had to have at
least one psychiatric admission to Bellevue Hospital Center, be age 18 or older at the time of
admission, receive either a diagnosis or rule-out diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia at the time
of discharge, and have completed the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007)
during their psychiatric hospitalization. Of note, although the subcategories schizophrenia are no
longer in the current DSM-5 (APA, 2013), due to the time period in which the data were
collected, these subcategories of schizophrenia were used clinically at the time of data collection.
And specifically, the diagnosis at the time of discharge was utilized in the inclusion criteria
because it was the diagnostic-related variable with the most complete data information. In order
to be included in the mental health experts group, participants had to be employed in either the
psychological or psychiatric field, have completed the PAI during an educational didactic
activity at Bellevue Hospital Center with instructions to simulate paranoid schizophrenia, and be
age 18 or older at the time of the educational didactic activity. Further details about the inclusion
and exclusion criteria are described in the Research Design and Procedure section below.
After consideration of the inclusion criteria, the current study sample included a group of
81 psychiatric inpatients, which represented 6.8% of the larger database of 1,198 psychiatric
inpatients who had a total of 1,244 psychiatric hospitalizations. Of the 1,244 psychiatric
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hospitalizations across the 1,198 inpatients, 27 individuals had completed the PAI more than
once. In 24 cases, individuals completed the PAI on two occasions. Of those 24 cases, the first
PAI administration was always included in the study, unless it had more missing variables than
the second administration. In 3 cases, individuals completed the PAI on three occasions. Of those
three cases, the first PAI administration was always included in the study, unless it had more
missing variables than the subsequent administrations. Of the 1,198 psychiatric inpatients, 331
individuals were diagnosed with or had a rule-out diagnosis of “schizophrenia and other
psychotic disorder” at the time of discharge. Of those 331 psychiatric inpatients, 146 individuals
were diagnosed with or had a rule-out diagnosis of schizophrenia at the time of discharge. Of
those 146 psychiatric patients with schizophrenia, 81 individuals were diagnosed with or had a
rule-out diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia at the time of discharge. These 81 psychiatric
inpatients with a diagnosis or rule-out diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia at the time of
discharge comprised the final sample of psychiatric inpatients.
The group of 81 psychiatric inpatients were admitted to the hospital under civil (34.6%; n
= 28) and forensic (64.2%; n = 52) statuses (datum for n = 1 was missing). Psychiatric inpatients
admitted under civil statuses included individuals deemed to be a risk of harm to self and/or
others. Psychiatric inpatients admitted under forensic statuses included individuals referred for
competency to stand trial and/or criminal responsibility evaluations in the context of their
criminal proceedings.
The psychiatric inpatients predominantly identified as male (90.1%, n = 73), while 8.6%
identified as female (n = 7). The gender identity datum for one participant was missing (1.2%; n
= 1). The average age was approximately 34 years old (M = 33.80, SD = 10.83, range = 18.17 to
63.52). The majority of the psychiatric inpatients identified as African American (56.8%, n =
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46), while 19.8% identified as Caucasian (n = 16), 14.8% identified as Hispanic (n = 12), 2.5%
identified as Asian (n = 2), and 6.1% identified as multiracial or other (n = 5). Approximately
75.3% (n = 61) of the psychiatric inpatients were diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia at the
time of discharge, while 24.7% (n = 20) were given a rule-out diagnosis of paranoid
schizophrenia at the time of discharge.
After consideration of the inclusion criteria, the current study sample included a group of
277 mental health experts across 280 PAI administrations. Mental health experts were included if
they earned an education in the psychological or psychiatric field, they participated in an
educational didactic activity on psychological testing led by the Primary Investigator of the
original research study between January 12, 1998 and October 27, 2009, they were at least 18
years of age at the time of the didactic activity, and they completed the PAI (Morey, 2007)
during the educational didactic activity with instructions to simulate paranoid schizophrenia. Of
the 280 PAI administrations, three of the mental health experts had completed two different
administrations of the PAI. In all three cases, the first PAI administration was always included in
the study, resulting in a sample of 277 mental health experts.
The mental health experts predominantly identified as female (66.8%, n = 185), while
31.4% identified as male (n = 87). The gender identity data for five participants were missing
(1.8%; n = 5). Available data indicated that the majority of the mental health experts identified as
White (27.8%, n = 77), while 0.4% identified as African American (n = 1), 1.1% identified as
Hispanic (n = 3), 3.6% identified as Asian (n = 10), and 0.4% identified as multiracial (n = 1).
However, racial data for approximately 66.8% of the mental health experts were missing (n =
185). Age data were unavailable for this group.

33

Approximately 28.9% of the mental health experts had expertise in psychiatry (n = 80),
while 69.0% had expertise in psychology (n = 191). Professional data for six participants were
missing (2.2%; n = 6). Of the psychiatric experts, 61.3% identified as medical students (n = 49),
16.3% identified as psychiatrists (n = 13), 10.0% identified as residents (n = 8), and 12.5%
identified as fellows (n = 10). Of the psychological experts, 2.6% identified as psychologists (n =
5), 34.6% identified as doctoral-level interns (n = 66), 36.1% identified as doctoral-level externs
(n = 69), 4.2% identified as doctoral students (n = 8), and 22.5% identified as master’s students
(n = 43).
Measures and Variables
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI). The PAI (Morey, 2007) is a 344-item selfreport measure of psychopathology. Individuals respond to items using a four-point Likert scale.
The PAI takes approximately 50-60 minutes to administer, and the measure has been validated
for individuals ranging from 18 to 89 years old. This measure consists of four validity scales,
eleven clinical scales, five treatment scales, and two interpersonal scales, as well as additional
indexes created to address particular assessment concerns. The four validity scales include the
Negative Impression Management (NIM) scale, Positive Impression Management (PIM) scale,
Inconsistency (INC) scale, and Infrequency (INF) scale (Morey, 2007). The NIM scale measures
the extent to which respondents describe themselves in an overly negative fashion, while PIM
measures the extent to which respondents present themselves in an overly positive and favorable
manner. The INC scale examines consistency of response style throughout the administration of
the PAI, and INF examines endorsement of infrequent or atypical symptoms (Morey, 2007).
Additional indexes that were created to further assess symptom validity on the PAI
include the Malingering Index (MAL), Defensiveness Index (DEF), Cashel Discriminant
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Function (CDF), and Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF). MAL is composed of eight profile
features which have been shown to occur much more frequently in profiles in which respondents
feigned a specific mental disorder, while DEF consists of features that have been shown to be
more present in the profiles of individuals attempting to minimize psychiatric problems (Morey,
1993; 1996). CDF further examines defensiveness and has been found to discriminate better than
PIM alone (Cashel et al., 1995). Finally, RDF consists of a combination of 20 PAI full scale,
validity, and subscale scores that differentiates simulated mental illness groups from genuine
clinical patients (Rogers et al., 1996). RDF is calculated by multiplying these 20 PAI T-scores by
their discriminant function weights and summing (Rogers et al., 1996). Taken together, these
scales and indexes are used to detect feigned psychological symptoms on the PAI.
Level of education in mental health. Participants in the mental health experts group
were asked to identify their level of education in their respective mental health field while
completing the PAI simulation activity. These participants were then dichotomized into mental
health experts with a doctoral degree or beyond and experts with less than a doctoral degree.
Those placed in the “with a doctoral degree or beyond” group included psychologists,
psychiatrists, residents, and fellows. Those placed in the “less than a doctoral degree” group
included medical students, doctoral-level interns, doctoral-level externs, doctoral students,
master’s students, and staff who provide monitoring services for the psychiatric inpatients.
Type of education in mental health. Participants in the mental health experts group
were asked to identify the type of education they received in the mental health field while
completing the PAI simulation activity. These participants were then dichotomized into those
with psychiatric expertise and those with psychological expertise. Those placed in the
“psychiatric expertise” group included psychiatrists, residents, fellows, and medical students.
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Those placed in the “psychological expertise” group included psychologists, doctoral-level
interns, doctoral-level externs, doctoral students, and master’s students. Staff who provide
monitoring services for the psychiatric inpatients were excluded from this dichotomy, as their
type of education and field of expertise was unknown.
Research Design and Procedure
The current study represents an archival analysis of a portion of data collected as part of a
larger study conducted at Bellevue Hospital Center through New York University School of
Medicine from January 12, 1998 until October 27, 2009. The original data set consists of
samples of civil and forensic psychiatric inpatients and mental health experts. All data from the
original research study were collected by a Senior Psychologist at Bellevue Hospital Center, who
served as Primary Investigator of the original research study. The sample of psychiatric
inpatients consisted of archival data collection of all civil and forensic psychiatric inpatient
records to examine all psychological testing results conducted for clinical purposes only. No
psychological testing was administered solely for research purposes. The mental health experts
group data were collected as part of an educational didactic activity led by the Primary
Investigator of the original research study. All participants in the mental health experts group
participated in an educational didactic activity about the utility of psychological testing. At the
conclusion of the didactic activity, all participants were presented with a Personality Assessment
Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007) and instructed to simulate responses on the PAI consistent with a
paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis. The purpose of this activity was to demonstrate how
challenging it is to feign a severe mental illness on psychological testing, even with expertise in
the mental health field. Participants received general feedback on the group’s performance in the
following educational didactic session, but they did not receive their individual results. The
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original research study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at New York University
School of Medicine/Bellevue Hospital Center.
For the current study, a fully de-identified data set that could not be linked to the identity
of any human subjects was provided to the Primary Investigator of the current study by the
Primary Investigator of the original research study. For the current study, psychiatric inpatients
were included if they had at least one psychiatric admission to Bellevue Hospital Center between
January 12, 1998 and October 27, 2009, they were at least 18 years of age at the time of the
psychiatric admission, they completed the PAI (Morey, 2007) for clinical purposes at any point
during their psychiatric hospitalization, and they received a discharge diagnosis or rule-out
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Of note, psychiatric inpatients were only included if they
received a discharge diagnosis or rule-out diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia because the group
of mental health experts were specifically instructed to simulate paranoid schizophrenia during
their PAI administrations. PAI scores were reviewed for all participants across both groups. The
validity of PAI profiles was determined using Morey’s (2007) recommended cut-scores for the
four validity scales, which include INC ≥ 73, INF ≥ 75, NIM ≥ 92, and PIM ≥ 68. The current
study received exempt approval by the Institutional Review Board at the City University of New
York/John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and the original research study was approved by the
Institutional Review Board at New York University School of Medicine/Bellevue Hospital
Center.
Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS Statistics Version 26. Statistical
significance were set at p < .05. Cohen’s d effect sizes were interpreted as small (d = 0.2),
medium (d = 0.5), and large (d = 0.8) when appropriate, and area under the curve (AUC) values
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were interpreted as high classification accuracy (AUC ≥ 0.8), moderate classification accuracy
(AUC = 0.7), and low classification accuracy (AUC < 0.7) when appropriate. First, all data were
screened for accuracy of data entry, missing information, and violations of all assumptions.
Then, descriptive statistics were calculated for the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index
in each group. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations were examined for these
variables in each group. Next, the three malingering indicators (NIM, MAL, and RDF) were
dummy coded to indicate if they were above or below the recommended cut-scores (NIM ≥ 92,
MAL ≥ 111, and RDF ≥ 59). A frequency of malingering variable was then created to indicate
how many of these scales (0, 1, 2, or 3) were elevated for participants within each group. This
procedure was repeated separately for the genuine patients and mental health experts groups.
Hypothesis #1 postulated that, using their expertise in the field, the mental health experts
group would be able to successfully feign paranoid schizophrenia on the PAI, such that they
would not have overall elevated scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index, but
they would have at least one elevated score on one of the eleven PAI clinical scales. Of note, the
current study did not restrict the clinical scales to only the paranoia and/or schizophrenia
subscales because of the range of symptoms associated with schizophrenia. For example, a
simulator making a genuine attempt to mimic symptoms associated with schizophrenia could
have focused on negative symptoms and have been elevated on a scale other than paranoia or
schizophrenia. Therefore, in order to be inclusive of what responses might indicate a genuine
attempt to feign schizophrenia, all eleven PAI clinical scales were considered. To examine this
hypothesis, means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations were calculated among the
mental health experts for scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index. These mean
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scores were then compared to the recommended cutoff scores (NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥ 111; RDF ≥
59). Elevations on the eleven PAI clinical scales were also examined.
Hypothesis #2 expected that the genuine psychiatric patients group would not be
identified as feigning psychiatric symptoms on the PAI, such that they would not have overall
elevated scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index. To examine this hypothesis,
means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations were calculated among the psychiatric
patients for scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index. These mean scores were
then compared to the recommended cutoff scores (NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥ 111; RDF ≥ 59).
Hypothesis #3 anticipated that, because the mental health experts were expected to feign
successfully, the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index would not demonstrate significant
predictive power or high classification accuracy between groups. To examine this hypothesis, the
NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index scores were dummy coded according to the
recommended cutoff scores (NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥ 111; RDF ≥ 59). Using these three dummy
coded variables and the frequency of malingering variable created above, several chi-square tests
of independence were calculated to determine if that malingering indicator successfully
differentiated between groups. When the assumptions of the chi-square test of independence
were violated, Fisher’s Exact Test was utilized instead. Then, Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve analyses were conducted for the NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index to
determine if they reached high levels of classification accuracy, indicated by area under the
curve (AUC) values of at least 0.8 or higher. As such, AUC values were reported and interpreted
for each malingering indicator.
Hypothesis #4 postulated that there would be no significant differences on the PAI NIM
scale, MAL index, or RDF index between the mental health experts group and genuine
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psychiatric patients group. To examine this hypothesis, a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was performed. This one-way ANOVA utilized group (genuine patients versus
mental health experts) as the between-subjects factor, and NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF
index T-scores were used as the outcome measures. The groups were examined for violations of
normality and variance. The F statistic, statistical significance, and effect size was reported. If
statistical significance was found, post-hoc analyses were conducted. Then, the mean difference
between groups, statistical significance, and effect size were reported for each post-hoc analysis.
Hypothesis #5 expected that when the MAL index cutoff score, RDF index cutoff score,
and NIM scale cutoff score were used together, this would improve classification accuracy above
the NIM scale cutoff score alone. To examine this hypothesis, two binary hierarchical logistic
regressions were conducted across both groups to determine the utility of the RDF index and
MAL index beyond the classification accuracy of the NIM scale. In the first binary hierarchical
logistic regression, the cutoff scores for each variable were utilized as the independent variables
(NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥ 111; RDF ≥ 59). In the second binary hierarchical logistic regression, each
malingering variable was entered using its continuous T-score. The type of group (psychiatric
inpatients or “genuine responders” vs. mental health experts or “feigners”) was entered as the
dependent variable in both models. Also in both models, the NIM scale variable was entered into
the model as a first step, and then the MAL index and RDF index were entered as a second step
in the model. For each binary hierarchical logistic regression, the overall model fit, Nagelkerke’s
R2, chi-square, and odds ratios were presented.
Hypothesis #6 examined differences only within the mental health experts group. It was
expected that, within the mental health experts group, those with doctoral degrees or beyond
would have significantly lower PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index scores, when
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compared with those with less than doctoral degrees in the mental health field. To examine this
hypothesis, another one-way ANOVA was performed. For this hypothesis, the mental health
experts group was divided into experts with a doctoral degree or beyond and experts with less
than a doctoral degree. The subsequent one-way ANOVA used these groups as the betweensubjects factor, and NIM, MAL, and RDF T-scores comprised the outcome measures. The
groups were examined for violations of normality and variance. The F statistic, statistical
significance, and effect size was reported. If statistical significance was found, post-hoc analyses
were conducted. Then, the mean difference between groups, statistical significance, and effect
size were reported for each post-hoc analysis.
Finally, Hypothesis #7 also investigated differences only within the mental health experts
group. It was anticipated that, within the mental health experts group, those in the psychiatric
field would have significantly higher scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index,
when compared with those in the psychological field. To examine this hypothesis, another oneway ANOVA was performed. For this hypothesis, the mental health experts group was divided
into those in the psychiatric field and those in the psychological field. The subsequent one-way
ANOVA utilized these groups as the between-subjects factor, and NIM, MAL, and RDF Tscores were entered as the outcome measures. The groups were examined for violations of
normality and variance. The F statistic, statistical significance, and effect size was reported. If
statistical significance was found, post-hoc analyses were conducted. Then, the mean difference
between groups, statistical significance, and effect size were reported for each post-hoc analysis.
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CHAPTER 3
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Prior to all analyses, data were screened for accuracy of data entry, missing values, and
violations of the assumptions of analyses. Screening identified multiple univariate outliers for
several of the study measures, including the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey,
2007) and selected PAI malingering indicators used for this study (Negative Impression
Management [NIM] scale; Malingering [MAL] index; and Rogers Discriminant Function [RDF]
index). Further, the NIM scale and RDF index produced skewness and kurtosis scores above
2.58, which violates the assumption of normality (Field, 2001). The presence of outliers and
violation of normality is expected, as these measures assess feigning and response style.
Feigning and response style are constructs that should not be expected to demonstrate normal
distributions. Further, several of the analyses conducted in this study did not require that data
exclude outliers. Specifically, Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve analyses and chisquare tests of independence used non-transformed values. Spearman’s rho was used in place of
Pearson’s correlations. Finally, logistic regression analyses were used in lieu of discriminant
function analyses, as logistic regression analyses are more resilient against violations of normal
distributions (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2010).
After the data were screened, descriptive statistics for the PAI negative impression
management (NIM) scale, Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF) index, and Malingering (MAL)
index were calculated for each group (see Table 1). Next, these three malingering indicators
(NIM, RDF, and MAL) were dummy coded to indicate if they were above or below the
recommended cut-scores (NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥ 111; RDF ≥ 59). A frequency of malingering
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variable was then created to indicate how many of these scales (0, 1, 2, or 3) were elevated for
participants within each group. Overall, the majority of the genuine psychiatric inpatients group
was classified as feigning on either zero (n = 35; 43.2%) or one (n = 35; 43.2%) measure, while
five participants (6.2%) were identified as feigning on two measures, and one participant (1.2%)
was identified as feigning on all three measures. On the other hand, the majority of the mental
health experts group was classified as feigning on one measure (n = 207; 74.7%), while 50
participants (18.1%) were identified as feigning on two measures, and ten participants (3.6%)
were identified as feigning on all three measures. A total of nine participants (3.2%) in the
mental health experts group were identified as responding honestly on all of the measures. Table
2 provides a summary of the participants in each group that were identified as feigning.
The PAI clinical scales were then examined for each group. Of note, the average number
of significant elevations (T ≥ 70) on the eleven PAI clinical scales across the psychiatric
inpatients group was 2.8 clinically significant elevations (M = 2.78, SD = 3.12, range = 0 to 11).
Meanwhile, the average number of significant elevations (T ≥ 70) on the eleven PAI clinical
scales across the mental health experts group was 4.8 clinically significant elevations (M = 4.79,
SD = 2.89, range = 0 to 11). Interestingly, out of the 81 psychiatric inpatients diagnosed with
genuine paranoid schizophrenia, only 48.1% (n = 39) scored in the clinically significant range on
the paranoia clinical scale, and only 32.1% (n = 26) scored in the clinically significant range on
the schizophrenia clinical scale. Out of the 277 mental health experts instructed to simulate
paranoid schizophrenia, 96.8% (n = 268) scored in the clinically significant range on the
paranoia clinical scale, and 88.4% (n = 245) scored in the clinically significant range on the
schizophrenia clinical scale.
Hypothesis #1
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Hypothesis #1 expected that, using their expertise in the field, the mental health experts
group would be able to successfully feign paranoid schizophrenia on the PAI, such that they
would not have overall elevated scores on the NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index, but they
would have at least one elevated score on one of the eleven PAI clinical scales. This hypothesis
was partially supported.
Overall, the mental health experts group was not able to successfully feign paranoid
schizophrenia on the PAI, as the majority of the experts were above the cutoff scores for at least
one of the three malingering indicator variables. Only nine participants (3.2%) in the mental
health experts group were identified as responding honestly on all three variables. The majority
were classified as feigning on one measure (n = 207; 74.7%), while 50 participants (18.1%) were
identified as feigning on two measures, and ten participants (3.6%) were identified as feigning on
all three measures. Table 2 provides a summary of the participants in the mental health experts
group that were identified as feigning, as well as their average significant elevations on the
eleven PAI clinical scales.
The eleven PAI clinical scales were then examined in further depth across this group. The
average number of significant elevations (T ≥ 70) on the eleven PAI clinical scales across the
mental health experts group was 4.8 clinically significant elevations (M = 4.79, SD = 2.89, range
= 0 to 11). However, of the 277 mental health experts, a total of six mental health experts had
zero significant elevations (T ≥ 70) on any of the eleven PAI clinical scales. Of these six mental
health experts, three participants (50%) were identified as responding honestly on all three
malingering variables, two participants (33.3%) were identified as feigning on one measure, and
datum for one participant (16.7%) was missing, likely due to an incomplete response set on the
PAI. Because these six mental health experts had no significant elevations (T ≥ 70) on any of the
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eleven PAI clinical scales and were therefore unlikely to have followed the instructions to feign
symptoms on the PAI, they were excluded from all further analyses.
For two of the three malingering indicators, the mean value earned by the mental health
experts group was below the recommended cutoff score, demonstrating that many participants
scored in the range suggesting a genuine response style. For the NIM scale, the average value
was approximately 76 (M = 75.93; SD = 18.29; n = 271). The recommended cutoff score is T ≥
92, demonstrating that many participants scored below the cutoff score, but within the range of
possible symptom exaggeration. Specifically, 79.3% (n = 215) of the mental health experts were
classified as genuine responders on the NIM scale. Similarly, for the MAL index, the average
value was approximately 77 (M = 76.99; SD = 17.29; n = 271). The recommended cutoff score is
T ≥ 111, demonstrating that many participants scored below the cutoff score. Specifically, 93.7%
(n = 254) of the mental health experts were classified as genuine responders on the MAL index.
On the other hand, for the RDF index, the average value was approximately 80 (M = 80.21; SD =
12.65; n = 271). The recommended cutoff score is T ≥ 59, demonstrating that many participants
scored above the cutoff score. Specifically, only 3.3% (n = 9) of the mental health experts were
classified as genuine responders on the RDF index.
Pearson’s R correlations revealed that within the mental health experts, NIM scale scores
were significantly positively correlated with MAL index scores, r(269) = . 534, p < .001.
Similarly, NIM scale scores were significantly positively correlated with RDF index scores,
r(269) = .129, p = .034. Finally, MAL index scores and RDF index scores were also significantly
positively correlated among the mental health experts, r(269) = .168, p = .006.
Hypothesis #2

45

Hypothesis #2 expected that the genuine psychiatric patients group would not be
identified as feigning psychiatric symptoms on the PAI, such that they would not have overall
elevated scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF index. This hypothesis was partially
supported.
Overall, the psychiatric inpatients group presented with genuine psychiatric symptoms in
general on the PAI, as the majority of the patients were below the cutoff scores on at least two of
the three malingering indicator variables. The majority of the genuine psychiatric inpatients
group was classified as feigning on either zero (n = 35; 43.2%) or one (n = 35; 43.2%) measure,
while five participants (6.2%) were identified as feigning on two measures, and one participant
(1.2%) was identified as feigning on all three measures. Table 2 provides a summary of the
participants in the psychiatric inpatients group that were identified as feigning, as well as their
average significant elevations on the eleven PAI clinical scales.
For all three malingering indicators, the mean value earned by the psychiatric inpatients
group was below the recommended cutoff score, demonstrating that many participants scored in
the range suggesting a genuine response style. For the NIM scale, the average value was
approximately 66 (M = 66.10; SD = 20.68; n = 81). The recommended cutoff score is T ≥ 92,
demonstrating that many participants scored below the cutoff score. Specifically, 86.4% (n = 70)
of the psychiatric inpatients were classified as genuine responders on the NIM scale. Similarly,
for the MAL index, the average value was approximately 64 (M = 64.20; SD = 16.32; n = 80).
The recommended cutoff score is T ≥ 111, demonstrating that many participants scored below
the cutoff score. Specifically, 98.8% (n = 80) of the psychiatric inpatients were classified as
genuine responders on the MAL index. Finally, for the RDF index, the average value was
slightly less than 59 (M = 58.67; SD = 10.43; n = 76). The recommended cutoff score is T ≥ 59,
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demonstrating that several participants scored conservatively below the cutoff score.
Specifically, 55.6% (n = 45) of the psychiatric inpatients were classified as genuine responders
on the RDF index.
Pearson’s R correlations revealed that within the psychiatric inpatients, NIM scale scores
were significantly positively correlated with MAL index scores, r(78) = . 613, p < .001.
However, NIM scale scores were not significantly correlated with RDF index scores, r(74) =
.055, p = . 635. Finally, MAL index scores and RDF index scores were also not significantly
correlated among the psychiatric inpatients, r(74) = .050, p = . 666.
However, not all psychiatric inpatients presented with clinically significant levels of
psychiatric symptoms. The average number of significant elevations (T ≥ 70) on the eleven PAI
clinical scales across this group was 2.8 clinically significant elevations (M = 2.78, SD = 3.12,
range = 0 to 11). A total of 20 (24.7%) of the psychiatric inpatients did not present with any
significant elevations on any of the eleven PAI clinical scales. This may indicate positive
impression management, or an underreporting of psychiatric symptoms. To further explore if
these 20 psychiatric inpatients were underreporting psychiatric symptoms at the time of their PAI
administration, their overall score on the positive impression management scale was examined.
These 20 patients earned a mean value of approximately 61 on the Positive Impression
Management (PIM) scale (M = 61.40; SD = 6.099; n = 20). This demonstrates that many of these
patients scored in the range suggesting a cautious but genuine response style. Another possible
explanation is that, because the PAI was administered to this group at any point during their
psychiatric hospitalization, these PAI responses may also indicate successful psychiatric
treatment and a reduction of symptoms reaching the level of clinical significance.
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Interestingly, out of the 81 psychiatric inpatients diagnosed with genuine paranoid
schizophrenia, only 48.1% (n = 39) scored in the clinically significant range on the paranoia
clinical scale, and only 32.1% (n = 26) scored in the clinically significant range on the
schizophrenia clinical scale. This indicates that while the majority of the psychiatric inpatients
presented with genuine psychiatric symptoms on the PAI, they were not necessarily symptoms
consistent with a paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis.
Hypothesis #3
Because the mental health experts were expected to successfully feign paranoid
schizophrenia on the PAI, Hypothesis #3 expected that the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and
RDF index would not demonstrate significant predictive power or high classification accuracy
between groups. This hypothesis was partially supported.
First, the classification rates for the NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index were
calculated according to the recommended cutoff scores (NIM ≥ 92, MAL ≥ 111, and RDF ≥ 59).
The percentage of participants classified as feigning in each group is presented in Table 3. The
overall classification accuracy for the NIM scale was 35.54%, 86.72% for the RDF index, and
27.19% for the MAL index. This data, as well as the sensitivity and specificity rates for each
malingering indicator, are also presented in Table 3. In general, the mental health experts group
scored higher than the psychiatric inpatients group on all three indicators of feigning. Overall,
the RDF index yielded the highest percentage of feigned responses across both groups. The
MAL index produced the lowest percentage of feigned responses across both groups.
After the classification rates for the NIM scale, RDF index, and MAL index were
calculated, as well as the count of scales/indexes above the cutoff scores, these four categorical
variables were analyzed using a chi-square test of independence to determine if each malingering
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indicator successfully differentiated between groups. Because the assumption of an expected
frequency of < 5 was violated for the MAL index, Fisher’s Exact Test was utilized instead. For
the NIM scale, there was no significant relationship between the group and NIM scale cutoff
scores, χ2(1) = 2.031, p = .154, Cramer’s V = .076. Similarly, for the MAL index, there was no
significant relationship between the group and MAL index cutoff scores, χ2(1) = 3.203, p = .086,
Cramer’s V = .096. This suggests that there was no association between NIM or MAL cutoff
scores and group, meaning both NIM and MAL cutoff scores did not successfully differentiate
between the psychiatric inpatients and mental health experts. On the other hand, for the RDF
index, there was a significant relationship between the group and RDF index cutoff scores, χ2(1)
= 119.009, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .586. This suggests that there was a significant association
between RDF cutoff scores and group, meaning RDF cutoff scores successfully differentiated
between the psychiatric inpatients and mental health experts. Finally, for the count of
scales/indexes above the cutoff scores, there was a significant relationship between the group and
count, χ2(3) = 110.389, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .564. This suggests that the count of
scales/indexes above the cutoff scores variable successfully differentiated between the
psychiatric inpatients and mental health experts.
Finally, to assess the classification accuracy of the NIM scale, RDF index, and MAL
index, three Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve analyses were conducted. The NIM
scale and MAL index significantly differentiated genuine psychiatric inpatients from simulating
mental health experts with a moderate level of classification accuracy, generating AUC values
less than .80. The NIM scale significantly generated moderate classification accuracy, AUC =
.656, 95% CI [.578, .733], p < .001, as did the MAL index, AUC = .703, 95% CI [.637, .769], p
< .001. However, the RDF index significantly generated a high level of classification accuracy,
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AUC = .913, 95% CI [.880, .945], p < .001. This indicates that, while all three malingering
indicators significantly differentiated genuine psychiatric inpatients from simulating mental
health experts, the RDF index did so with high classification accuracy (AUC = .913), while the
NIM scale (AUC = .656) and MAL index (AUC = .703) did so with only moderate classification
accuracy. The ROC curve is presented in Figure 1.
Hypothesis #4
Hypothesis #4 expected that there would be no significant differences on the PAI NIM
scale, MAL index, or RDF index between the mental health experts group and genuine
psychiatric patients group, signifying that the expertise within the mental health experts group
impacted their ability to successfully feign paranoid schizophrenia. This hypothesis was not
supported.
To examine this hypothesis, three one-way ANOVAs were performed with the group as
the between-subjects factor, and the PAI NIM scale, PAI RDF index, and PAI MAL index as the
respective indicators of feigning. Both groups were examined for violations of normality and
variance. Neither of the groups violated skewness or kurtosis, and therefore did not violate
assumptions of normality. Homogeneity of variance was not violated for any of the analyses. The
type of group had a statistically significant effect on PAI NIM scale scores, F(1, 350) = 16.948, p
< .001, η2 = 0.046; PAI RDF index scores, F(1, 345) = 184.827, p < .001, η2 = 0.349; and PAI
MAL index scores, F(1, 349) = 34.631, p < .001, η2 = 0.090. Results from the PAI NIM scale
score revealed that the mental health experts group scored higher on the PAI NIM scale than the
psychiatric inpatients group (Mdiff = 9.83, d = 0.52). Similarly, results from the PAI RDF index
score revealed that the mental health experts group scored higher on the PAI RDF index than the
psychiatric inpatients group (Mdiff = 21.54, d = 1.77). Finally, results from the PAI MAL index
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score revealed that the mental health experts group scored higher on the PAI MAL index than the
psychiatric inpatients group (Mdiff = 12.79, d = 0.75). Because the mental health experts group
scored significantly higher on all three malingering indicators when compared to the psychiatric
inpatients, they did not successfully feign paranoid schizophrenia on the PAI.
Hypothesis #5
Hypothesis #5 expected that when the MAL index cutoff score, RDF index cutoff score,
and NIM scale cutoff score were used together, this would improve classification accuracy above
the NIM scale cutoff score alone. This hypothesis was partially supported.
To investigate Hypothesis #5, two binary hierarchical logistic regressions were conducted
across both groups to determine the utility of the RDF index and MAL index beyond the
classification accuracy of the NIM scale. In the first binary hierarchical logistic regression, the
cutoff scores for each variable were utilized as the independent variables (NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥
111; RDF ≥ 59), with the scores below the cutoff serving as the reference group. The type of
group (psychiatric inpatients or mental health experts) was entered as the dependent variable. For
the independent variables, the NIM scale variable was entered into the model as a first step, and
then the MAL index and RDF index were entered as a second step in the model. The first step of
the model did not demonstrate an overall good fit, Nagelkerke’s R2 = .007. The NIM scale cutoff
score was not an improvement over the default model, 𝜒2(1) = 1.538, p = .215. As such, the NIM
scale cutoff score was not a significant predictor of type of group (b = 0.431, Wald = 1.444, p =
.230, OR = 1.539, 95% CI [0.762, 3.110]). Classification accuracy did not improve from the base
step (78.1%) to the model with the NIM scale cutoff score entered as a predictor (78.1%).
However, the second step of the model demonstrated an overall good fit, Nagelkerke’s R2 = .390.
The RDF index cutoff score and MAL index cutoff score were an improvement over the first
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step of the model, 𝜒2(2) = 99.869, p < .001. The odds of being placed into the mental health
experts group were 32.321 times higher for those who scored above the RDF index cutoff score
when compared to those who were below the cutoff score, b = 3.476, Wald = 70.528, p < .001,
OR = 32.321, 95% CI [14.362, 72.740]. However, the MAL index cutoff score was not a
significant predictor of type of group (b = 1.366, Wald = 1.317, p = .251, OR = 3.920, 95% CI
[0.380, 40.404]). Overall classification accuracy improved from the first step of the model
(78.1%) to the second step of the model with the RDF index and MAL index cutoff scores
entered as predictors (87.3%).
In the second binary hierarchical logistic regression, each malingering variable (NIM
scale, MAL index, and RDF index) was entered using its continuous T-score, and the type of
group (psychiatric inpatients or mental health experts) was entered as the dependent variable.
Once again, the NIM scale variable was entered into the model as a first step, and then the MAL
index and RDF index were entered as a second step in the model. The first step of the model
demonstrated an overall good fit, Nagelkerke’s R2 = .062. The NIM scale was an improvement
over the default model, 𝜒2(1) = 14.227, p < .001. For every one T-score point increase, the odds
of being placed into the mental health experts group were multiplied by 1.028, b = .028, Wald =
12.661, p < .001, OR = 1.028, 95% CI [1.013, 1.044]. However, classification accuracy did not
improve from the base step (78.1%) to the model with the NIM scale entered as a predictor
(78.1%). Once again, the second step of the model demonstrated an overall good fit,
Nagelkerke’s R2 = .537. The RDF index and MAL index were an improvement over the first step
of the model, 𝜒2(2) = 134.736, p < .001. For every one T-score point increase in the RDF index,
the odds of being placed into the mental health experts group were multiplied by 1.145, b = .135,
Wald = 64.531, p < .001, OR = 1.145, 95% CI [1.108, 1.183]. Similarly, for every one T-score
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point increase in the MAL index, the odds of being placed into the mental health experts group
were multiplied by 1.029, b = .029, Wald = 5.568, p = .018, OR = 1.029, 95% CI [1.005, 1.054].
Overall classification accuracy improved from the first step of the model (78.1%) to the second
step of the model with the RDF index and MAL index entered as predictors (87.6%).
Examining Mental Health Experts
To address the remaining hypotheses, differences only within the mental health experts
group were examined. Prior to investigating Hypotheses #6 and #7, additional descriptive
characteristics about this group were calculated. The type of expertise (psychology or psychiatry)
was calculated, as well as the length of expertise (less than doctoral degree or doctoral degree
and beyond) among the mental health experts group (see Table 4). In general, the majority of the
mental health experts had less than a doctoral degree (n = 236; 87.1%). Also, the majority of this
group had expertise in the discipline of psychology (n = 189; 69.7%). Then, descriptive statistics
were calculated again based on type and length of expertise for the mental health experts group
only. Table 5 examines the PAI NIM scale, PAI RDF index, and PAI MAL index scores among
the mental health experts group by education level, and Table 6 presents the same indicators of
feigning among the mental health experts group by discipline. In general, the indicators of
feigning were similar across education levels. They were also very similar across discipline.
These descriptive characteristics were utilized to examine differences within the mental health
experts group in the remaining hypotheses.
Hypothesis #6
Hypothesis #6 expected that, within the mental health experts group, those with doctoral
degrees or beyond would be significantly less likely to be detected as feigning on the PAI, such
that they would have significantly lower PAI NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index scores,
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when compared with those with less than doctoral degrees in the mental health field. Table 5
presents the PAI NIM scale, PAI RDF index, and PAI MAL index scores among the mental
health experts group by education level. This hypothesis was not supported.
To examine this hypothesis, three one-way ANOVAs were performed with mental health
experts’ education levels as the between-subjects factor, and the PAI NIM scale, PAI RDF index,
and PAI MAL index as the respective indicators of feigning. Both groups were examined for
violations of normality and variance. Neither of the groups violated skewness or kurtosis, and
therefore did not violate assumptions of normality. Homogeneity of variance was not violated for
any of the analyses. The mental health experts’ education levels did not have a statistically
significant effect on PAI NIM scale scores, F(1, 269) = 0.684, p = 0.409, η2 = 0.003; PAI RDF
index scores, F(1, 269) = 0.331, p = 0.566, η2 = 0.001; or PAI MAL index scores, F(1, 269) =
0.291, p = .590, η2 = 0.001. Results from the PAI NIM scale score revealed that the mental health
experts with less than a doctoral degree scored higher on the PAI NIM scale than those with a
doctoral degree or beyond (Mdiff = 2.74, d = 0.15). Similarly, results from the PAI RDF index
score revealed that the mental health experts with less than a doctoral degree scored higher on
the PAI RDF index than those with a doctoral degree or beyond (Mdiff = 1.32, d = 0.10).
However, results from the PAI MAL index score revealed that the mental health experts with a
doctoral degree or beyond scored higher on the PAI MAL index than those with less than a
doctoral degree (Mdiff = 1.69, d = 0.10). These analyses indicate that there were no significant
differences in the malingering indicators when examining the mental health experts by education
levels.
Hypothesis #7
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Hypothesis #7 expected that, within the mental health experts group, those in the
psychiatric field would be significantly more likely to be detected as feigning on the PAI, such
that they would have significantly higher scores on the PAI NIM scale, MAL index, or RDF
index, when compared with those in the psychological field. Table 6 presents the PAI NIM scale,
PAI RDF index, and PAI MAL index scores among the mental health experts group by
discipline. Once again, this hypothesis was not supported.
To examine this hypothesis, once again, three one-way ANOVAs were performed with
mental health experts’ fields of discipline as the between-subjects factor, and the PAI NIM scale,
PAI RDF index, and PAI MAL index as the respective indicators of feigning. Both groups were
examined for violations of normality and variance. Neither of the groups violated skewness or
kurtosis, and therefore did not violate assumptions of normality. Homogeneity of variance was
not violated for any of the analyses. The mental health experts’ fields of discipline did not have a
statistically significant effect on PAI NIM scale scores, F(1, 264) = 0.087, p = 0.768, η2 < 0.001;
PAI RDF index scores, F(1, 264) = 1.519, p = 0.219, η2 = 0.006; or PAI MAL index scores, F(1,
264) = 2.084, p = 0.150, η2 = 0.008. Results from the PAI NIM scale score revealed that the
mental health experts in the discipline of psychology scored higher on the PAI NIM scale than
those in the discipline of psychiatry (Mdiff = 0.73, d = 0.04). Similarly, results from the PAI RDF
index score revealed that the mental health experts in the discipline of psychology scored higher
on the PAI RDF index than those in the discipline of psychiatry (Mdiff = 2.09, d = 0.17). On the
other hand, results from the PAI MAL index score revealed that the mental health experts in the
discipline of psychiatry scored higher on the PAI MAL index than those in the discipline of
psychology (Mdiff = 3.38, d = 0.20). These analyses indicate that there were no significant
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differences in the malingering indicators when examining the mental health experts by
discipline.

56

CHAPTER 4
Discussion and Conclusions
This study added to the body of literature examining mental health experts as simulators,
and it was also one of the first to examine the impact of professional differences within the
expert sample. This study concluded that mental health experts are not necessarily more
successful at feigning psychiatric symptoms than other more commonly utilized populations in
simulation designs. Interestingly, because a large sample of mental health experts were utilized
in this study, differences within this group were able to be examined. This study split the mental
health experts group up by both the type of their expertise (psychology or psychiatry), as well as
the length of their expertise (less than doctoral degree or doctoral degree and beyond). It was
found that there were no significant differences when examining either of the differences within
the mental health experts group. Taken together, based on the results of this study, mental health
experts may not necessarily serve as more “sophisticated” simulators in these research designs,
despite their expertise in the relevant disciplines. None of the malingering scales indicated both
high rates of sensitivity and specificity. These findings are consistent with previous research
examining differences within mental health disciplines (e.g., Bagby et al., 1997a). This further
supports the notion that “expertise” in a particular discipline is a multidimensional construct.
Those with expertise in psychiatry compared to psychology undergo different training and
clinical opportunities, which may clearly impact the manifestation of their expertise.
When examining the groups utilized in this study more closely, the differences between
their psychiatric presentations is more evident. For example, the majority of the mental health
experts were “caught” as feigners by at least one of the PAI malingering indicators used in this
study. In fact, only a very small portion (2.2%) of mental health experts were identified as
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genuine responders on all three malingering indicators. However, mental health experts’ scores
on the three malingering indicators demonstrated more mixed findings. First, consistent with
previous research findings (e.g., Morey & Lanier, 1998; Rios & Morey, 2013), of the three
malingering indicators included in the present study, the RDF index demonstrated the largest
effect sizes distinguishing genuine psychiatric inpatients from simulating mental health experts.
A total of 262 (96.7%) of mental health experts scored above the recommended cutoff for the
RDF index and were correctly detected as simulators in the present study. The RDF index was
initially created because it best differentiated groups of individuals feigning emotional conditions
from genuine clinical patients (Rogers et al., 1996), and it continues to demonstrate robustness in
its detection of feigned symptoms. In the present study, the RDF index demonstrated an overall
classification accuracy of approximately 87%, with very strong sensitivity. The findings from the
present study provide further support for the existing literature (e.g., Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009;
Morey, 2012) describing the utility of the RDF index in identifying feigned psychiatric
symptoms. This scale might be less impacted by the noise related to general distress. However,
the same empirical literature that supports the use of this scale in the identification of those
feigning symptoms gives rise to a related concern regarding the high rate of false positive
identifications in this study. Almost half (~44%) of genuine participants were identified as
feigning using this scale.
Again, consistent with prior research literature (e.g., Rios & Morey, 2013), the NIM scale
and MAL index indicators demonstrated more mixed findings. Both of these indicators
demonstrated a moderate effect size in distinguishing genuine psychiatric inpatients from
simulating mental health experts. The NIM scale successfully differentiated the two groups, and
the mean NIM scale score demonstrated that many mental health experts presented a psychiatric
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presentation consisting of possible symptom exaggeration. However, the NIM scale displayed
poor sensitivity (~21%), resulting in an overall classification accuracy of approximately 36%.
The MAL index indicator also distinguished the two groups, but with moderate classification
accuracy. Similar to the NIM scale, the MAL index demonstrated poor sensitivity (~6%) but
strong specificity (~99%). To further illustrate this point, the majority of the simulating mental
health experts (~94%) were identified as honest responders using the MAL index cutoff score.
The MAL index was created to detect feigned severe psychopathology (Rios & Morey, 2013), so
these findings demonstrate that the majority of mental health experts did not simulate psychiatric
symptoms above this severity threshold on their PAI administration. Taken together, these
findings provide further support that the NIM scale and MAL index may capture more
exaggerated symptomatology, but the RDF index adequately captures truly feigned
symptomatology. The findings from the present study therefore demonstrate the utility of the
RDF index in the identification of simulators within this population. However, given the high
rate of false positives, the RDF index might be better used as a screening measure of feigning,
particularly in cases related to severe symptomatology.
In general, the psychiatric inpatients’ scores on the malingering indicators were
substantially lower than those of the mental health experts, and the mean values for all three
malingering indicators were below the corresponding recommended cutoff scores. Overall, the
number of malingering indicators that each participant was above the cutoff score for
significantly differentiated between the two groups in this study. But, when evaluating for
feigning in clinical settings, evaluators may not use multiple scales to reach a determination
about feigning, and even if they do, there is still the possibility for a high rate of false positives.
For example, in the present study, approximately 43% of genuine psychiatric inpatients were
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classified as feigning on one measure, about 6% were identified as feigning on two measures,
and about 1% was identified as feigning on all three measures. A total of 11 (13.6%) genuine
psychiatric inpatients were identified as feigning on the NIM scale, a total of 36 (44.4%) on the
RDF index, and a total of 1 (1.2%) on the MAL index. These percentages indicate that patients
who present with genuine mental illnesses in clinical settings are at risk of being inaccurately
labeled as having a feigned response style or exaggerating their psychiatric presentations.
Further, the psychiatric inpatients in this study had more varied clinical presentations, as
evidenced by their lower proportion of participants above the clinical significance cutoff score
on both the schizophrenia (~68%) and paranoia (~52%) subscales. These findings indicate that
clinicians may overpathologize patients presenting with genuine psychiatric symptoms,
particularly if their symptoms do not align with their reported psychiatric presentations. These
results provide support for a multimethod approach in the assessment of malingering.
It is also important to note that participant motivation plays an important role in
simulation designs. This was evident when examining the eleven PAI clinical scales across both
groups. The average number of significant elevations on these scales in the psychiatric inpatients
group was approximately three, compared to about five for the mental health experts.
Participants in the psychiatric inpatients group were hospitalized at the time of their PAI
administration, and they may have been motivated to present themselves in a positive or
favorable manner in order to achieve discharge from the inpatient setting. This is particularly
relevant in the cases of involuntary psychiatric hospitalizations. For example, despite their
psychiatric diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, approximately 25% of participants in this group
endorsed no clinically significant symptoms on the PAI. When this subgroup was examined
more closely, it is possible that they responded cautiously on the PAI, but still trended towards a
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genuine response style. Another possible explanation is that, because the PAI was administered
to this group at any point during their psychiatric hospitalization, these PAI responses may also
indicate successful psychiatric treatment and a reduction of symptoms reaching the level of
clinical significance. Therefore, this lower response rate of clinically significant elevations could
be explained by a combination of possible underreporting in conjunction with psychiatric
stabilization.
On the other hand, the average number of significant elevations on the clinical scales in
the mental health group was about five, approximately two scale elevations higher than the
psychiatric inpatients group. One possibility for this is that the mental health experts may have
been motivated to learn about the relevant clinical symptoms, but not necessarily motivated to
feign only those specific symptoms. Mental health experts were instructed to simulate symptoms
of paranoid schizophrenia specifically, but their overall motivation may have led to their higher
number of endorsed clinically significant symptoms. Especially due to their expertise in the
mental health field, they may have been intrinsically motivated to demonstrate their skill or
expertise in the field, resulting in an endorsement of more symptoms, and possibly more specific
symptoms. For example, if mental health experts listed and endorsed each criterion for
schizophrenia during their PAI administration, this may have inadvertently elevated comorbid
anxiety and/or depression scores, resulting in more clinically significant clinical scales overall.
Alternatively, it is possible that the mental health experts did not demonstrate an understanding
of the specific symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia, resulting in the endorsement of more
clinical scales overall. However, it is possible for individuals to receive a diagnosis of
schizophrenia without endorsing every criterion related to the mental illness. These differing
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motivations between the psychiatric inpatients and mental health experts could have impacted
the findings on the three malingering indicators in general.
Another interesting finding to note was the differences in clinical significance on the PAI
paranoia and schizophrenia clinical scales. All of the psychiatric inpatients included in this study
were either diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia or given a rule-out diagnosis of paranoid
schizophrenia at the time of discharge. Despite this inclusion criteria, the majority of the
psychiatric inpatients did not earn a clinically significant scale score on the paranoia clinical
scale (~52%) or the schizophrenia clinical scale (~68%). On the other hand, the overwhelming
majority of the mental health experts earned a clinically significant scale score on the paranoia
clinical scale (~99%) and schizophrenia clinical scale (~90%). Once again, the differing
motivations of the groups utilized in this study must be considered when interpreting these
findings.
This study featured a widely used psychological measure, the Personality Assessment
Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007). Existing research has found that the PAI has several validity
indicators are sensitive to both coached and uncoached feigning. For uncoached feigning, the
effect sizes are even larger when identifying feigning of severe mental illnesses rather than
anxiety or mood disorders, and when comparing feigners to clinical patients rather than honest
respondents (Hawes & Boccaccini, 2009). This study instructed mental health experts to simulate
a severe mental illness, paranoid schizophrenia, which advances this body of literature.
Consistent with previous findings, the NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index variables were all
significantly different between these two groups. The mental health experts group scored
significantly higher than the psychiatric inpatients on all three of these malingering indicators,
despite their mental health expertise, and despite being compared to clinical patients diagnosed
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with a severe mental illness. These findings provide further support for the utility of these
validity indicators on the PAI using mental health experts as simulators. However, these findings
must also be weighed against the high risk for false positives that was demonstrated in the
present study. The results provide evidence that genuine psychiatric inpatients presenting with
true mental illnesses in clinical settings may be at risk of being overpathologized or inaccurately
labeled as a feigner. This is particularly concerning in light of the juxtaposition between high
rates of false positives on malingering scales and low rates of elevated scores on clinical scales.
Therefore, although the PAI demonstrated utility in distinguishing simulating mental health
experts as such, several genuine psychiatric inpatients were also incorrectly detected as feigning.
If the PAI is utilized in these contexts, a multimethod approach in the assessment of malingering
is strongly indicated.
Existing research has described several indicators of feigning that can be observed by
evaluators throughout the assessment process. For example, individuals attempting to feign may
reiterate the prevalence of these symptoms several times throughout the clinical interview in an
attempt to remind the evaluator of their severity. However, due to fatigue, these individuals may
stop endorsing such symptoms as well (Conroy & Kwartner, 2006; Rogers, 1997; Rogers &
Bender, 2003). But, based on the results of the present study, distinguishing genuine from
feigned psychiatric presentations is not a simple or clear-cut task for evaluators. Even with the
utility of the PAI in the present study, there was an overwhelming risk for false positives.
Therefore, it is worthy to consider whether these potential indicators of feigning may also be
described by the individual’s desire for help, the cyclical nature of their psychiatric symptoms, or
general ambivalence about trusting an evaluator with such vulnerable and personal information.
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Once again, these findings provide significant support for the need of a multimethod assessment
of feigning.
Simulation designs are the most popular methodology to examine the ability of
psychological testing to accurately distinguish genuine from feigned mental illness (Rogers &
Gillard, 2011). Simulation studies have been published since the 1980s (Berry & Nelson, 2010),
but the context of feigning has changed since that time. For example, in recent years, there has
been a substantial amount of literature made available through the use of the internet. Now, with
a simple internet search, individuals wishing to feign a particular disorder have easy access to
information about relevant psychiatric symptoms. Even further, there is growing
acknowledgment of mental illness in society more broadly. These factors may allow individuals
wishing to feign to be more successful at such a task. Therefore, research using simulation
designs must be mindful of the access to information that individuals instructed to feign
symptoms have using modern technology. To mitigate these concerns, mental health experts may
be particularly appealing to serve as simulators, as they have true knowledge of mental illnesses
from direct clinical experience. Using mental health experts as simulators instead of the more
commonly utilized undergraduate participants also allows researchers to examine whether those
with direct clinical knowledge may feign more successfully than those with only academic
knowledge from the classroom. Further, mental health experts may serve as a suitable proxy for
individuals who attempt to feign psychiatric symptoms in real world contexts due to their
intrinsic motivations. Although the motivation of mental health experts is exclusively related to
their desire to learn about the disorder (rather than simulate the disorder in the study) due to their
own professional goals, this could better mimic the motivations for external gain that serve as an
impetus for individuals wishing to learn about psychiatric symptoms in order to feign.
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This study was one of the first to examine differences within mental health experts
serving as simulators. Mental health experts were split by both the type of their expertise
(psychology or psychiatry), as well as the length of their expertise (less than doctoral degree or
doctoral degree and beyond). Even when splitting the mental health experts up, there were still
no significant differences by either type or length of expertise. Taken together, neither predoctoral nor doctoral training in a mental health field indicated an ability to feign psychiatric
symptoms more successfully, and the same was found for those with expertise in the
psychological field compared to the psychiatric field. Overall, based on the findings in this study,
mental health experts did not serve as more “sophisticated” simulators in this simulation research
design, as their expertise learned through educational training did not predict more successful
feigning of psychiatric symptoms. Mental health experts were detected by all three PAI
malingering indicators, including the NIM scale, MAL index, and RDF index.
Limitations
Despite the novel findings this study added to the extant literature, there are several
limitations that must be considered when interpreting these findings. First, the data were
previously collected and analyzed using an archival analysis. Therefore, any data that were
missing were unable to be recovered. For example, age data were missing for all of the mental
health experts, and racial data were missing for the majority (~66%) of the mental health experts
as well. Therefore, this potentially limits the generalizability of these findings, as it is unknown if
this sample of mental health experts is generalizable to the broader population.
A further in-depth examination of the psychiatric inpatients group is warranted. First,
psychiatric inpatients were included in the current study if they were diagnosed with or had a
rule-out diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia at the time of their discharge. This limitation
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resulted in the inclusion of approximately 75% of patients with the diagnosis, and approximately
25% of patients with the rule-out diagnosis. Given that about 25% of the psychiatric patients
only had a rule-out diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and may have had other diagnoses, this
could have impacted their presentations on the feigning indicators. This limitation must be
considered as the presentation of these psychiatric inpatients is compared to those of the mental
health experts. Further, approximately 64% of the psychiatric inpatients were admitted to the
hospital under forensic statuses. As discussed in the foundation for the current study, there is
clear external motivation to feign or exaggerate psychiatric symptoms in such psycholegal
contexts. As such, there is a higher than usual likelihood that some of these psychiatric patients
would have been attempting to malinger psychiatric symptoms during their PAI administration.
These characteristics of the psychiatric inpatients group must be considered during the
interpretation of the findings in the current study.
Another limitation to be considered includes the participants across both groups that did
not present with any significant elevations on any of the eleven PAI clinical scales. A total of six
mental health experts did not have any significant elevations on the clinical scales. Therefore,
they were deemed as unlikely to have understood and/or followed the instructions to feign
psychiatric symptoms on the PAI. As a result, they were excluded from all further analyses in the
present study. On the other hand, there were also a total of 20 psychiatric inpatients that did not
present with any significant elevations on the clinical scales, but they were still included in
subsequent analyses. These decisions were made because it was assumed that the mental health
experts who did not elevate any of the clinical scales either did not understand or did not follow
the instructions to simulate paranoid schizophrenia. This assumption is a limitation which could
have been assessed further with the inclusion of a post-test questionnaire in the present study.
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However, a post-test questionnaire regarding the study’s feigning instructions was not included
during the original data collection. The psychiatric inpatients who did not elevate clinical scales
still had either a discharge diagnosis or rule-out discharge diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia,
so even though they did not elevate any clinical scales at the time of their PAI administration, it
was assumed that they still experienced psychiatric symptoms during the course of their
psychiatric hospitalization. These assumptions are clear limitations that must be considered
during the interpretation of the research findings.
Further, the psychiatric inpatients presented with a wider variety of psychiatric symptoms
during their administration of the PAI. Even though all 81 psychiatric inpatients were diagnosed
with genuine paranoid schizophrenia at the time of their discharge, only approximately 48%
scored in the clinically significant range on the paranoia clinical scale, and only about 32%
scored in the clinically significant range on the schizophrenia clinical scale. While the
psychiatric inpatients presented with genuine psychiatric symptoms, they were not necessarily
symptoms consistent with a paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis. This may have been impacted by
the time in which they completed the PAI during the course of their psychiatric hospitalization,
as it could have been offered to them at any time during their hospitalization. However, these
findings imply that the psychiatric inpatients had a variety of psychiatric symptoms despite their
diagnostic labels. These important clinical findings must be considered when interpreting the
feigning results from the current study.
Also, the way in which participant motivation in each group may have impacted the
results in this study must be considered as a limitation. On average, the simulating mental health
experts endorsed two more clinical scales above clinical significance when compared to the
genuine psychiatric inpatients. Mental health experts may have been motivated to learn about the
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relevant clinical symptoms, but not necessarily motivated to feign only those specific symptoms.
The psychiatric inpatients were all hospitalized at the time of their PAI administration, and they
may have been motivated to present themselves in a positive or favorable manner in order to
achieve discharge. This may be particularly relevant for patients who were hospitalized
involuntarily. On the other hand, the mental health experts may have been intrinsically motivated
to demonstrate their skill or expertise in the field, or they may not have understood the specific
symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia. Both of these factors could have resulted in the
endorsement of more clinical scales overall for the mental health experts. Other simulation
research studies have utilized a post-test questionnaire to ensure that simulating participants
understood and followed the simulation instructions. However, as previously mentioned, a posttest questionnaire was not utilized during the original data collection.
Further, an additional limitation in this study is that the mental health experts did not
complete a separate administration of the PAI in which they were instructed to respond honestly.
Therefore, it is unknown how this group would have scored if they answered honestly, including
whether they had any genuine symptoms of mental illness. As a result, their simulated PAI
responses could not be compared to their simulated responses. The lack of a comparison with the
mental health experts’ honest responses may have impacted their ability to successfully feign a
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.
Another limitation in this study to consider is the operationalization of mental health
experts by level of education. Mental health experts were dichotomized into those with a
doctoral degree or beyond and those with less than a doctoral degree. Experts placed in the “with
a doctoral degree or beyond” group included psychologists, psychiatrists, residents, and fellows,
and experts placed in the “less than a doctoral degree” group included medical students,
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doctoral-level interns, doctoral-level externs, doctoral students, master’s students, and staff who
provide monitoring services for the psychiatric inpatients. However, these academic milestones
assume equivalent degrees of experience, which may not have held true for each expert. It is
possible that some experts in the less than a doctoral degree group could have more relevant
experience than some experts in the doctoral degree or beyond group. For example, doctorallevel interns may have several more years of mental health experience than a resident.
Nonetheless, information about years of experience was not available in the data set. Therefore,
these possible idiosyncrasies must be considered when interpreting the findings from the present
study.
A final limitation in this study is the use of an outdated psychiatric diagnosis. The data
were collected from January 12, 1998 until October 27, 2009, in which the current edition of the
DSM was the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) or DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). In those editions of the DSM,
the subcategory of “paranoid” schizophrenia was current. As a result, the group of mental health
experts were specifically instructed to simulate paranoid schizophrenia during their PAI
administrations. However, in 2013, the DSM-IV-TR was replaced with the DSM-5, and the
subcategories of schizophrenia were eliminated (APA, 2013). Therefore, this subcategory of
“paranoid” schizophrenia is no longer in the current DSM-5, but it was a current diagnosis when
the data was collected.
Future Directions
The results of this study suggested that mental health experts did not serve as more
“sophisticated” feigners in this simulation research design. Despite their expertise, mental health
experts were detected as simulators by all three PAI malingering indicators, including the NIM
scale, MAL index, and RDF index. However, even though the mental health experts scored
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significantly higher on all three of these malingering indicators and were significantly more
likely to be detected as feigning on at least one of the indicators, mental health experts did not
necessarily score above the recommended cutoff scores on all three of these variables. Further,
this study demonstrated a high risk for false positives among genuine psychiatric inpatients.
Almost half of the genuine psychiatric inpatients (~43%) were classified as feigning on one
measure, about 6% were identified as feigning on two measures, and about 1% was identified as
feigning on all three measures. Patients who present with genuine mental illnesses in clinical
settings are at risk of being overpathologized or inaccurately labeled as having a feigned
response style. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that both the NIM scale and MAL
index had difficulty successfully differentiating between the simulating mental health experts
and genuine psychiatric inpatients in this study. While the NIM scale scores suggested possible
symptom exaggeration among mental health experts, their average score was not above the
cutoff, limiting its classification accuracy. On the other hand, both the RDF index scores and
count of scales/indexes above the cutoff scores significantly differentiated between these two
groups. The RDF index generated excellent overall classification accuracy (~87%),
demonstrating its utility above the NIM scale (~36%) and MAL index (~27%) in distinguishing
between simulators and honest responders.
These findings demonstrate that the academic and clinical knowledge learned by mental
health experts may not necessarily translate to accurate simulation of psychiatric symptoms.
However, these findings also provide promise for the fear that individuals wishing to feign a
particular disorder now have access to substantial relevant literature using modern technology
and a simple internet search, which may lead them to feign more successfully. In this study,
mental health experts, who had both academic and direct clinical knowledge, were still detected
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as simulators using multiple malingering indicators on the PAI. The NIM scale, MAL index, and
RDF index all successfully differentiated between the simulating mental health experts and
genuine psychiatric inpatients, although the RDF index demonstrated superiority with excellent
classification accuracy when compared to the remaining two indicators.
Future research is needed to build upon these findings and their generalizability. While
this was one of the first studies to examine differences within mental health experts based on
their type of discipline and level of education, some of their demographic data were unavailable,
limiting the generalizability of these findings. Future research should gather comprehensive
demographic data on all participants. Further, additional research should address the potential
impact of motivation on findings of malingering. One method that could be utilized to mitigate
this possibility is requiring that mental health experts complete a separate administration of the
PAI in which they are instructed to respond honestly. This comparison would allow for stronger
conclusions to be drawn regarding the impact of mental health experts’ honest responses on their
feigned responses. Finally, future research should be conducted using the current psychiatric
diagnosis of schizophrenia, rather than examining an outdated subcategory. Utilizing the
diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5 would continue to build this body of literature on the use of
mental health experts as participants in simulation designs.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics by Group for PAI NIM Scale, RDF Index, and MAL Index
NIM Scale
Group

Patients

M

SD

n

66.10

20.68

81

RDF Index
d

M

SD

n

58.67

10.43

76

0.52
Simulators

75.93

18.29

271

MAL Index
d

M

SD

n

64.20

16.32

80

1.77
80.21

12.65

271

d

0.75
76.99

17.29

271

Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; NIM = Negative Impression Management; RDF
= Rogers Discriminant Function; MAL = Malingering.
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Table 2
Count of Scales/Indexes above Cutoff Scores for Feigning
Patients
Clinical Scale
Elevations

Simulators

Number of
Feigning
Scales/Indexes

M

SD

0

1.94

1.85

35

1

2.80

3.25

2

9.00

3

10.00

n

Clinical Scale
Elevations

%

n

%

M

SD

43.2

2.89

2.80

9

3.2

35

43.2

4.09

2.49

207

74.7

1.58

5

6.2

7.32

2.39

50

18.1

N/A

1

1.2

8.09

2.02

10

3.6

Note. The Negative Impression Management (NIM) scale, Malingering (MAL) index, and
Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF) index were utilized in this count using the recommended
cutoff scores (NIM ≥ 92; MAL ≥ 111; RDF ≥ 59).
Note. Data for five participants in the patients group and one participant in the simulators group
was missing in this count due to incalculable RDF index scores.
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Table 3
Participants Above Published Cutoff Scores and Classification Rates for Each Scale/Index
Patients
Scales/
Indexes

Simulators

Published
Cutoff
n

%

n

%

Sensitivity

Specificity

PPA

a

NPA

Overall
Classification
Accuracy

a

NIM
Scale

≥ 92

11

13.6

56

20.7

20.66%

86.42%

83.88%

24.15%

35.54%

RDF
Index

≥ 59

36

44.4

262

96.7

96.68%

52.63%

87.47%

82.25%

86.72%

MAL
Index

≥ 111

1

1.2

17

6.3

6.27%

98.75%

94.50%

23.55%

27.19%

Note. NIM = Negative Impression Management; RDF = Rogers Discriminant Function; MAL =
Malingering; PPA = Positive Predictive Accuracy; NPA = Negative Predictive Accuracy.
a

The base rate in this sample = 77.38%
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Table 4
Expertise among Simulators
N

%

236

87.1

Medical Students

47

17.3

Doctoral-Level Interns

64

23.6

Doctoral-Level Externs

69

25.5

Doctoral Students

8

3.0

Master’s Students

43

15.9

Hospital Staff

5

1.8

Doctoral Degree or Beyond

35

12.9

Psychologists

5

1.8

Psychiatrists

12

4.4

Residents

8

3.0

Fellows

10

3.7

189

71.1

Doctoral-Level Interns

64

24.1

Doctoral-Level Externs

69

25.9

Doctoral Students

8

3.0

Master’s Students

43

16.2

Psychologists

5

1.9

77

28.9

Medical Students

47

17.7

Psychiatrists

12

4.5

Residents

8

3.0

Fellows

10

3.8

Less Than Doctoral Degree

Psychology Discipline

Psychiatry Discipline

Note. Hospital Staff were excluded from Discipline since this information was unknown (N =
266).
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics by Education Level for PAI NIM Scale, RDF Index, and MAL Index
NIM Scale
Education
Level
LTDD

M

SD

n

76.28

18.41

236

RDF Index
d

M

SD

n

80.38

12.71

236

0.15
DDOB

73.54

17.47

35

MAL Index
d

M

SD

n

76.77

17.62

236

0.10
79.06

12.37

35

d

-0.10
78.46

15.06

35

Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; NIM = Negative Impression Management; RDF
= Rogers Discriminant Function; MAL = Malingering; LTDD = less than doctoral degree;
DDOB = doctoral degree or beyond.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics by Discipline for PAI NIM Scale, RDF Index, and MAL Index
NIM Scale
Discipline

M

SD

n

Psychology

76.20

18.41

189

RDF Index
d

M

SD

n

80.77

12.47

189

0.04
Psychiatry

75.47

18.29

77

MAL Index
d

M

SD

n

76.13

17.04

189

0.17
78.68

12.86

77

d

-0.20
79.51

17.99

77

Note. PAI = Personality Assessment Inventory; NIM = Negative Impression Management; RDF
= Rogers Discriminant Function; MAL = Malingering.
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Figure 1. ROC Curve for the NIM Scale, RDF Index, and MAL Index Comparing Genuine
Psychiatric Inpatients and Simulating Mental Health Experts.
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